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The Rescue of the US Auto Industry,
Module Z: Overview
Rosalind Z. Wiggins,1 Greg Feldberg2, Alexander Nye,3 and Andrew Metrick4
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
April 8, 2022
Abstract
In the fall of 2008, credit markets tightened amid a broader economic downturn that
severely impacted the US auto industry, especially the three largest domestic
manufacturers, General Motors (GM), Ford Motors, and Chrysler. The companies requested
assistance from the government in a bid to stay afloat, but Congress declined to authorize
funding. The Bush administration, however, provided bridge loans to GM and Chrysler
under the Auto Industry Finance Program (AIFP), funded through the Troubled Assets
Relief Program (TARP), to sustain them until the Obama administration was in place.
Within months, the Obama administration decided that a speedy bankruptcy would be the
appropriate way to restructure the companies into viable organizations. Treasury provided
financing via TARP as Chrysler, then GM, went through an expedited bankruptcy process. In
support of the restructurings, Treasury also provided assistance to GMAC, Chrysler
Financial, and to certain auto suppliers, in addition to supporting consumer warranties,
bringing total government support for the industry to approximately $80 billion. Although
the government lost money on the AIFP, the rescue was relatively popular politically and
both companies returned to profitability in 2011. This case discusses the various aspects of
the government’s assistance to the auto industry that began in December 2008 and wound
down in December 2013.
Keywords: auto industry, bankruptcy, Chrysler, General Motors, restructuring, TARP
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Introductory note: In analyzing the facilities that were components of this rescue effort a
color-coded system is used to highlight particularly noteworthy design features. Our colorcoding system is as follows:
Treatment
BLUE: INTERESTING

Meaning
A design feature that is interesting and that
policymakers may want to consider. Typically,
this determination is based on the
observation that the design feature involves a
unique and potentially promising way of
addressing a challenge common to this type of
program that may not be obvious. Less
commonly, there will be empirical evidence or
a widely held consensus that the design
feature was effective in this context, in which
case we will describe that evidence or
consensus.

YELLOW: CAUTION INDICATED

A design feature that policymakers should
exercise caution in considering. Typically, this
determination is based on the observation
that the designers of the feature later made
significant changes to the feature with the
intention of improving the functioning of the
program. Less commonly, there will be
empirical evidence or a widely held consensus
that the design feature was ineffective in this
context, in which case we will describe that
evidence or consensus.

FOOTNOTE IN ITALICS

Where the reason that a given design feature
has been highlighted is not apparent from the
text, it is accompanied by an italicized
footnote that explains why we chose to
highlight it as we did. Where necessary,
footnotes will be used to identify any caveats
or additional considerations that should be
kept in mind when thinking about the feature.

This highlighting is not intended to be dispositive. The fact that a design feature is not
highlighted or is highlighted yellow does not mean that it should not be considered or that
it will never be effective under any circumstances. Similarly, the fact that a design feature is
not highlighted or is highlighted blue does not mean that it should always be considered or
will be effective under all circumstances. The highlighting is our subjective attempt to guide
readers toward certain design features that (1) may not be obvious but are worth
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considering or (2) require caution in considering. Readers must always consider these
features while keeping in mind the contents of the survey as a whole and their own
particular context and objectives.

Introduction
The Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) has written eight case studies that examine
in detail the various elements of the US government’s assistance to two auto
manufacturers, General Motors (GM) and Chrysler Holdings (Chrysler), and tangentially to
auto finance companies, suppliers, and customers during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),
beginning in 2008.
The government rescue of GM and Chrysler during the GFC presents an unusual case study
for crisis fighters. In modern capitalist economies, the practice of government intervention
in financial institutions is well established. While the details of such interventions remain
hotly debated, it is clear that government’s statutory roles as deposit insurer and lender of
last resort provide a justification to actively intervene in this context.
Industrial companies are different. With few exceptions, capitalist democracies take a
hands-off approach to nonfinancial corporate failure, restricting their role to contract
enforcement and the administration of the bankruptcy process. In this way, the rescues of
GM and Chrysler represented a consequential shift in crisis policy. In taking this action, it is
clear that the US government was motivated by a mix of economic and political
considerations that had no clear precedent, and the action raises (unanswered) questions
about the general theory of such interventions.5 Under what circumstances would a future
intervention in a nonfinancial company be considered?
Furthermore, once the government chose to intervene, it exercised a level of control over
the companies that was far greater than for past or contemporaneous open-bank
interventions or other assistance to financial institutions. For a long period of time,
policymakers held effective operational control (or at least veto power) over many
corporate actions. For a country without any recent experience of government control of
enterprise, this was also a significant precedent.

Generally, government assistance to nonfinancial industries has been limited to airlines and other “critical
industries,” such as railroads. However, during crises, a few governments have also acted to support other
nonfinancial industries whose failure might pose a systemic risk to the economy. For example, during the
GFC, France, Russia, and Sweden also assisted their auto industries. (For a discussion of aid to critical
industries, see Wiggins and Unnava 2020). Additionally, it is worth noting that in 1979, during a recession,
the US government assisted Chrysler with $1.5 billion in government guaranteed loans while requiring of it
$2 billion in cost-cutting concessions. Chrysler was also required to submit a business plan and granted the
government warrants for Chrysler stock which ultimately netted it a $500 million profit (NPR 2008).
5
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These two major strategic decisions—to intervene in a nonfinancial company and to do so
by exercising significant operational control—are worthy of detailed study. The debate on
these questions has inspired work from an interdisciplinary list of scholars, with no clear
consensus yet.6 That is not our subject here.
In this overview case and the other related cases, we review the government’s actions in
the GM and Chrysler rescue and analyze how the rescue was conceived and executed in
order to better understand how nonbank institutions in distress may be supported. In so
doing, we take the government’s activist intervention strategy as given and accept that it
has already decided to intervene and to take significant operational control. Thus, in this
case and the other related cases, we focus on the tactical decisions made to implement
the government’s strategy. That is, we view the GM and Chrysler case study as an
opportunity to examine the key design decisions required by the underlying strategy of
activist intervention, since similar implementation decisions could also show up in more
traditional contexts.
While this overview case may be read on its own, it is best read in connection with the
other YPFS cases on the auto industry rescue, which provide additional detail with respect
to each intervention utilized. The other YPFS cases, published in 2022 and considering the
various elements of the government’s rescue of the US auto industry, are:
•

“The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module A: Automotive Bridge Loans” by
Alexander Nye.

•

“The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module B: Restructuring General Motors
Through Bankruptcy” by Kaleb B. Nygaard.

•

“The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module C: Restructuring Chrysler
Through Bankruptcy” by Alexander Nye.

•

“The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module D: Emergency Assistance to Ally
Financial (formerly GMAC)” by Riki Matsumoto and Kaleb B. Nygaard.

•

“The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module E: Emergency Assistance for
Chrysler Financial” by Alexander Nye.

•

“The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module F: Auto Supplier Support

See, for example, Goolsbee and Kruger (2015), “The rescue of the U.S. automobile industry . . . was a
consequential, controversial, and difficult decision”; Klier and Rubenstein (2012), “the ensuing restructuring
of the Detroit Three has substantially changed the industry in the U.S.”); Lubben (2009), “these cases, and
particularly their structure—a quick lender-controlled §363 sale—are entirely within the mainstream of
Chapter 11 practice for the last decade”; and Roe and Skeel (2009), “We conclude that the Chrysler
bankruptcy cannot be understood as complying with good bankruptcy practice.”
6
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Program” by Riki Matsumoto.
•

“The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module G: The Auto Warranty Commitment
Program” by Benjamin Henken.

The cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at:
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol4/iss1.
In the first part of this overview case, we review the market factors and particular
circumstances that led to GM and Chrysler’s weakened conditions. We next consider the
assistance provided to the two manufacturers by the government beginning in December
2008, and tangential support to the auto finance companies, suppliers, and customers.
Next, we discuss the key decisions made by the government and highlight unique issues
presented by GM, Chrysler, and by the highly integrated nature of the automotive industry.
Lastly, we discuss conclusions that may be of assistance in future efforts.

I.

Background

The Troubles of the Auto Manufacturers
The fall of 2008 marked a period of severe economic distress for financial institutions
around the world. The 10-year US housing bubble burst, and its effects began to
reverberate throughout the financial system. These effects included a widespread decline
in housing prices, an increase in delinquencies and foreclosures, and a considerable
decrease in the value of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), and other related instruments (FCIC 2010, 301). As a result, beginning
in fall 2007, credit markets began to tighten. Within a year, many such markets, including
the securitization market, which played an important role in auto financing, practically
froze as banks and financial institutions attempted to protect themselves from a developing
unprecedented downturn in the broader economy (FCIC 2010, 301).
The US auto industry has long been a major component of the country’s economy and is a
dominant employer in certain regions. Formed in 1908, General Motors was the largest US
manufacturer through most of the century (History.com 2020b; Engelhardt 2009; GAO
2009b, 5). In 1953, then–GM president Charlie Wilson famously said that “for years I
thought what was good for the country was good for General Motors and vice versa.” This
statement would soon be transmuted into the popular slogan: “What’s good for General
Motors is good for the country” (Engelhardt 2009). Ford Motor Company (Ford), which
pioneered the assembly line process, was incorporated in 1903; and Chrysler Holdings
(Chrysler) was first formed as a company in 1925 (History.com 2020a; Iacocca 2014). For
decades, GM, Chrysler, and Ford were the largest US auto manufacturers and came to be
called the “Big Three.” They would later be called the “Detroit Three” as other
manufacturers, notably foreign transplant manufacturers such as Honda Motor Co., Toyota
Motor Corp, and the Volkswagen AG, established factories outside of the industry’s
traditional midwestern center.
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US auto manufacturers maintained their prominence during most of the century. Periods of
stagnation were balanced by decades of growth. By 2008, the Detroit Three sat atop a vast
interdependent web that included financial companies and thousands of parts suppliers
and dealers. As of the end of 2007, the Detroit Three employed 239,341 workers in the US
while the foreign transplants employed roughly 113,000 people, mostly based in the nonunion south (McAlinden, Dzicek, and Menk 2008, 2). In total, “the motor vehicle and parts
industries employed 732,800 workers directly as of September 2008” (McAlinden, Dzicek,
and Menk 2008, 2). Tens of thousands of auto dealers accounted for many more jobs
throughout the country (Statista 2022).
However, the industry had undergone significant changes and challenges over the decades.
It had to wrestle with competition from the foreign transplant manufacturers, who focused
on fuel-efficient passenger cars, and the impact of rising oil and gas prices (Goolsbee and
Krueger 2015, 5-6). By 2008, the Detroit Three were plagued by “the widespread
perception of perennial quality and reliability issues, lower resale values, poorly received
new models, and a lack of low-gas-mileage cars at times of rising fuel costs” (Goolsbee and
Krueger 2015, 5). They were also burdened with high wages and significant legacy costs for
health care and pensions. (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 6–7; Klier and Rubenstein 2012,
36–37). In 2008, they were “directly and indirectly responsible for funding the health care
of 2 million employees, retirees, and dependents of their own companies and their
suppliers” (McAlinden, Dzicek, and Menk 2008, 6). They were also responsible for the
pensions of 600,000 retirees, obligations which were underfunded by $29 billion (GAO
2009b, 7).
The weaknesses of the Detroit Three were particularly striking in comparison to
operations of the foreign transplant companies, which industry analysts and critics argued
were more competitive than the Detroit Three in many ways. The transplants paid lower
wages, faced no legacy costs, and produced vehicles that were not only more reliable and
popular but also achieved greater resale prices (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 5–7).
The tightening credit markets of 2008 negatively impacted the Detroit Three
manufacturers in several ways, including slower sales, lower profits, and increased cost of
funding. All had come to rely on increasing amounts of debt and felt the effects of increased
costs. However, Ford was more prepared than GM or Chrysler when the crisis hit. In
September 2006, it had hired a new CEO, the first from outside the company, and in
December, Ford had secured a $23.5 billion line of credit by pledging virtually all of its
assets as collateral (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 37). Thus, Ford had significant liquidity to
rely on as the other companies scrambled to raise funds.
Chrysler and GM reported 2008 losses of $8 billion and $31 billion, respectively (GAO
2009b, 5). They had to resort to significant borrowings to meet ongoing cash needs. In their
2008 audit report of the company, GM’s auditors “raised ‘substantial doubt’ about GM’s
ability to continue as a going concern due to ‘recurring losses from operations,
stockholders’ deficit, and inability to generate sufficient cash flow to meet its obligations’”
(GAO 2009b, 5–6). Chrysler struggled with similar circumstances. In a proposed
restructuring plan submitted to Congress, the manufacturer stated that additional federal
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funds would be needed to prevent the company from having to file for bankruptcy (GAO
2009b, 6).
Beginning in December 2008, the federal government extended credit to the two
automakers to avoid their bankruptcy. It phrased its purpose like this:
The objective of this program is to prevent a significant disruption of the American
automotive industry that poses a systemic risk to financial market stability and will
have a negative effect on the real economy of the United States (Treasury n.d.c).
Funding was conditioned on the manufacturers presenting credible viability plans
describing their paths to long-term stability. As discussed in the “Program Description”
section, the government provided various types of funding to the two manufacturers,
however, due to the integrated nature of the auto industry, it also provided support to
tangential industry sectors and customers.
Industry Structure and Related Issues
The US auto industry is a highly integrated industry of manufacturers, dealers, parts
suppliers, and finance companies. (Figure 1 illustrates the financial interdependence
among these relationships.) Operations of one manufacturer can impact those of another
through shared suppliers. These factors, as the government was to learn, presented issues
that would have to be addressed if government funds flowing to the manufacturers were to
have their intended benefits.
Figure 1: Key Financial Relationships in the Auto Industry

Source: GAO 2009b, 9.
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Auto Financing
Because vehicles are significant high-cost purchases, the overwhelming majority of retail
purchases in the United States—80–90 percent—are financed through loans, many directly
from a manufacturer’s financing arm (COP 2009b, 7; Bloom 2009a, 25). Dealers also rely on
“floor plan financing” to purchase almost all their inventory from the manufacturers, and
these receivables are traditionally securitized as asset-backed securities (ABS) (COP 2009b,
7). The tightening credit conditions of 2008 caused increases in dealer and customer
financing costs, and the rising costs exacerbated already plummeting sales, with sales for
the Detroit Three declining about 25% between January and October 2008 (COP 2009b, 7;
BEA n.d.). In addition, new auto loans are often funded through securitization of loans as
ABS, but in the fall of 2008, the ABS securitization markets were largely frozen, drastically
reducing the supply of credit to consumers and businesses (GAO 2009b, 32).
The government came to realize that government assistance to sustain GM and Chrysler
would be futile if the cars could not get to the dealers and consumers. Given the need for
financing of both dealer inventory and consumer sales, GM and Chrysler each stated in
their original viability plans that the health of their financing partners, GMAC LLC (GMAC)
and Chrysler Financial, respectively, were critical to their successful restructuring (GAO
2009b, 32–33). Given these facts, the US Treasury Auto Team would come to determine
that if they “were going to prevent a collapse of the auto industry in the short run, and
support a recovery in the long run, it would require stabilizing the auto finance industry.”
(Deese, Shafran, and Jester 2020, 368).
GMAC. The primary source of financing for GM’s dealers and consumers was the automobile
finance unit of GMAC, which would change its name to Ally Financial in 20107 (Ally
Financial 2010a). GMAC had begun as a captive subsidiary, but GM spun off the unit in
2006. A controlling interest was acquired by the private-equity firm Cerberus Capital
Management, which would later purchase Chrysler Financial and Chrysler.8 GMAC also had
a large mortgage subsidiary, Residential Capital, LLC, commonly known as ResCap, which it
had acquired in 1990.9 ResCap was a significant originator of subprime mortgages and one

GMAC LLC was renamed Ally Financial in 2010. See Ally Financial 2020. However, GMAC/Ally will be
referred to as GMAC throughout this case for the purpose of consistency.
8 By 2008, Chrysler Financial and GMAC, once the captive financing arms of Chrysler and GM, were owned by
Cerberus Capital Management, a private investment firm. Cerberus owned 100 percent of Chrysler Financial
and 51 percent of GMAC (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 49, fn1).
9 In a press release of December 24, 2008, the company described itself as follows, “GMAC Financial Services
is a global finance company operating in and servicing North America, South America, Europe and AsiaPacific. GMAC specializes in automotive finance, real estate finance, insurance, commercial finance, and online
banking. As of Dec. 31, 2007, the organization had $248 billion in assets and serviced 15 million customers”
(GMAC LLC 2008e). ResCap eventually filed for bankruptcy in 2012 (de la Merced 2012).
7
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of the largest mortgage securitizers and servicers in the country. It would be hard hit by the
subprime crisis that developed in 2007 with upstream impacts to GMAC.10
In 2008, GM retained a significant ownership interest in GMAC, and aspects of the captive
relationship remained. Subject to certain limitations, GM was required to offer GMAC
services exclusively if it offered vehicle financing and leasing incentives to customers (Ally
Financial 2011, 2). As a result, GMAC facilitated more than 30% of GM’s retail sales (GMAC
2009, 12). It also provided more than 80% of the floor plan financing used by the GM dealer
network to buy new vehicle inventory (GMAC 2009, 46). As further discussed at “Program
Description: Assistance to Related Segments of the Auto Industry, Assistance to Auto
Finance Companies, GMAC/Ally Financial,” to restore liquidity to GMAC’s auto finance
business, the government intervened with assistance in a variety of forms, including
liquidity and capital assistance, originating from a number of agencies. (Also see
Matsumoto and Nygaard 2022 for further detailed discussion of assistance to GMAC.)
Chrysler Financial. In early April 2009, Treasury realized that Chrysler’s bankruptcy filing
would cause Chrysler Financial’s bankers to withdraw its remaining credit lines. Cerberus,
which owned significant interests in both GMAC and Chrysler Financial, proposed merging
the two auto finance companies. Instead, GMAC’s CEO suggested winding down Chrysler
Financial and letting GMAC finance Chrysler vehicles going forward. Treasury agreed.
Chrysler Financial would go into “runoff mode,” continuing to hold the loans that it had
made but not making new ones. It thus would coordinate a new financing relationship
between Chrysler and GMAC, with GMAC taking over the role as primary financer for
Chrysler from Chrysler Financial (Rattner 2011, 147; see also Nye 2022b and further
discussion at “Program Description: Assistance to Related Segments of the Auto Industry,
Assistance to Auto Finance Companies and Chrysler Financial.”
Auto Parts Suppliers
The US auto parts supply industry is broad and highly integrated across manufacturers,
which creates a significant risk of contagion. For example, the Motor and Equipment
Manufacturers Association (MEMA) released data in 2009 showing that 66 percent of
Chrysler suppliers were also suppliers to GM, and 54 percent were suppliers to Ford
Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 11). The same network also supplied parts to the Japanese
transplants,11 which did not seek government assistance (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 11).
In autumn 2008, US auto parts suppliers were also experiencing deteriorated automotive
markets, disrupted manufacturer operations, and stressed credit markets; several major
At the end of 2007, GMAC had $248 billion in assets, including $82 billion in ResCap. The mortgage bust in
2007 hit ResCap hard; over 2007 and 2008, the company posted $10 billion in losses. GMAC’s auto finance
unit, profitable in 2007, lost $2.1 billion in 2008 (GMAC LLC 2009, 27).
11 We use the term “Japanese transplants” in this paper to refer to the Japanese auto manufacturers producing
vehicles in the US largely outside of the Midwest. In 2008, this included Nissan Motor Company, Toyota Motor
Corporation, and American Honda Motor Company and their related brands.
10
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suppliers were on the verge of collapse (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 11). A failure of GM or
Chrysler would have negatively impacted the network of suppliers and caused knock-on
effects to the broader auto industry. Given these factors, to support the rehabilitation of GM
and Chrysler, the government would decide to provide assistance to certain auto suppliers.
See discussion at “Program Description: Assistance to Related Segments of the Auto
Industry, Auto Parts Suppliers” and Matsumoto 2022 for further details.
Customer Warranties
A third related area where the government ultimately provided support was
manufacturer’s warranties. The manufacturers felt strongly that customers were much less
likely to purchase a vehicle from a company in financial distress because of the risk that it
might not be around to stand by its warranties, which were for multiple years (Goolsbee
and Krueger 2015, 21). When requesting funding, the CEOs of the Detroit Three said that
this meant that any effort to reorganize through bankruptcy would likely fail and quickly
become a liquidation as customers deserted the company (Canis et al. 2009, 52).
A survey by CNW Marketing Research “reportedly indicated that 80% of consumers said
that concerns about warranty coverage and replacement parts would make them unlikely
to buy a car from a company operating in bankruptcy reorganization” (Canis et al. 2009,
52). Two later surveys, including another by CNW, however, indicated that this consumer
reluctance to purchase vehicles from a bankrupt institution could be reduced or
neutralized if the government were backing the reorganization (Canis et al. 2009, 52).
Because of these dynamics, to encourage consumer purchases of GM and Chrysler vehicles
while the companies were restructuring, the government agreed to provide protection of
customer warranties (Treasury 2009c; Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 21). See discussion at
“Program Description: Assistance to Related Segments of the Auto Industry, Auto Warranty
Commitment Program” and Henken 2022.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and the Troubled Assets Relief Program
On October 3, 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA), which created the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP); $350
billion of the funds were released immediately12 (Canis et al. 2009, 9, 42). Under TARP,
Treasury was granted authority to purchase or guarantee up to $700 billion in “troubled
assets” from “financial institutions” through its Office of Financial Stability (EESA, 1). At the
time, there was uncertainty whether assistance to the auto manufacturers fell within the
scope of the law13 (COP 2009b, 115).

Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008), 12 U.S.C.§ 5201.
A September 2009 Congressional Oversight Committee (COP) report found that “there is a strong
suggestion in the Congressional Record that many in Congress also believed that EESA was a statute aimed
specifically at the financial sector” (COP 2009b, 115). The Committee’s report urged Treasury to seek a legal
12
13
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Nevertheless, on October 13, shortly after the law passed, the CEO of GM, the largest of the
Detroit Three, first requested emergency funding from Treasury Secretary Henry M.
Paulson, Jr., because the company was having trouble financing basic day-to-day operations
(Deese, Shafran, and Jester 2020, 363; Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 36–37; Goolsbee and
Krueger 2015, 7). Chrysler was experiencing similar difficulties and soon requested
assistance as well, as did Ford, the second-largest auto manufacturer (Klier and Rubenstein
2012, 36–37). Although Ford appeared before Congress at the November 2008 hearing, it
ultimately did not receive targeted assistance from the Treasury.14
The Bush administration’s initial response to the auto manufacturers’ request for
assistance was “no,” since at first President George W. Bush and Secretary Paulson did not
believe that Congress had authorized TARP funds to be used for an auto bailout (COP
2009b 71–73; Rogers 2008).
The Detroit Three CEOs then reached out via their significant political contacts15 and in
November appeared before “the House and the Senate to request a $25 billion working
capital ‘bridge loan’ from the US government . . . to help keep them out of bankruptcy and
avoid possible liquidation”16 (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 5). On November 17, Senator

opinion regarding the use of TARP for the auto rescue, which it did, receiving an opinion from the
department’s general counsel’s office that supported Treasury’s actions (COP 2009b, 115; McNeill 2022, 2).
As of March 27, 2009, Treasury had publicly announced funding programs under TARP totaling $667.4
billion, most of which was used to purchase or guarantee troubled assets from financial institutions, and
about $422.4 billion had been apportioned (GAO 2010, 1, fn1).
14 At one point, Ford requested from Congress a $9 billion credit line to provide a backstop in case the
economy worsened. As far as we have been able to determine, it was not granted (Kiely 2011). Ford did,
however, avail itself of several broad-based programs established by the government during this time, such
as the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF). It also participated in the Department of Energy’s Advanced Technology Vehicle
Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan Program in support of fuel-efficient vehicles during 2009 and 2010 (Adrian and
Schaumburg 2012; Canis and Yacobucci 2015; BdofGov 2009). Also, because of the interdependence of the
parts supply chain on which it also relied, Ford was publicly supportive of the government providing
assistance to GM and Chrysler because it feared that their failure would cause a chain reaction that would
negatively impact its own production (Goolsbee and Kruger 2015, 11).
15 Because of its size and significance, the auto industry has long had a well-funded and influential lobbying
voice. In 2009, the industry spent $60.2 million on lobbying efforts, a reduction from 2008, during which it
spent $66.9 million, and there were “576 auto industry lobbyists working for 124 clients, such as carmakers,
auto suppliers, lobbying groups and trade associations.” (Ransom 2010).
16 Ford joined GM and Chrysler in testifying before Congress, however, it ultimately did not pursue targeted
assistance from the Treasury (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 36). Although it was also struggling under the
effects of the burgeoning crisis, the company had taken several steps that helped it prepare for the difficulties
it faced. In September, the company hired a new CEO and in December arranged a credit line of $23.5 billion.
As a result, the company did not accept support from the Treasury, although it was eligible to request the
same if it wished (COP 2009b, 35; Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 35).
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Harry Reid introduced a bill17 that would have provided up to $25 billion to fund bridge
loans to the auto companies using some of the money authorized for TARP, but the bill
failed to progress beyond some introductory remarks in the Senate (UCE Act 2008; Canis et
al. 2009, 42).
On December 10, the House passed a more detailed bill, H.R. 7321, the “Auto Industry
Financing and Restructuring Act” (AIFRA 2008).18 The AIFRA would have financed a $14
billion bailout by reallocating funds appropriated to a Department of Energy (DoE) loan
program under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.19 However, the AIFRA
bill failed to pass in the Senate (Canis et al. 2009, 8–9).
Then, Senate Banking Committee Chair Christopher Dodd sent a request to Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke asking, among other things, for him to provide the
Committee with thoughts and comments on the plans submitted by the companies,
evaluate GM’s statement regarding the potential broad economic ramifications that might
attend its collapse, and “inform the Committee whether there is anything in your statute
that prevents you from lending to any of these domestic auto-manufacturing companies
through Section 13(3), or through a special purpose vehicle, which you have used to extend
funds to other institutions” (Dodd 2008). Bernanke was reported to have all but eliminated
the possibility of Fed participation in an auto industry bailout due to the companies’ likely
inadequate collateral and his view that aiding the nonfinancial companies was best left to
Congress: “Our view is that questions of industrial policy are best resolved by Congress
because they require balancing political and social priorities about the shape and
desirability of involvement by domestic companies in specific industries”20 (Rogers 2008).
After legislative action to assist the auto companies failed, the Bush administration
reversed its position. It decided to use TARP funds to keep the companies alive for the
remainder of the presidential transition period, with hopes of providing an opportunity for
the Obama administration to review the situation and consider further assistance to put
them on the path to restructuring. This reversed position was possible because of the

Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2008, S.3688: “A bill to provide for additional emergency
unemployment compensation, to amend the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 to authorize loans
to automobile manufacturers and component suppliers, and for other purposes,” 110th Congress.
18 Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring Act, H.R. 7321, 110th Congress (2008).
19 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Public Law 110–140 (2007).
20 It is worth noting that while tools may be available, if and how those tools are administered and deployed
may impact the solutions that can be crafted. This can have significant impact when addressing the potential
failure of a systemically important financial institution. During the GFC, in the US, some such situations
required ad hoc and multifaceted solutions accomplished by the use of many tools and the coordination
among several agencies. See for example Wiggins, Lawson, et al. (2021) and Zanger-Tishler and Wiggins
(2021). For other jurisdictions, the existence of more tools in fewer authorities may facilitate quicker and
more nimble responses.
17
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broad wording written into TARP21 (Paulson 2010, 416–427; also see Key Design Decision
No. 3.)
In December 2008, President Bush authorized Secretary Paulson to exercise his authority
to use TARP funds to assist the auto industry. However, at the time, President Bush and
Secretary Paulson were publicly circumspect on this use of TARP. President Bush
addressed the nation, pointing out that, “if we were to allow the free market to take its
course now, it would almost certainly lead to disorderly bankruptcy and liquidation for the
automakers,” but that “in the midst of a financial crisis and a recession, allowing the US
auto industry to collapse is not a responsible course of action” (White House 2008). The
Federal government would, he said, “grant loans to auto companies under conditions
similar to those Congress considered last week [in H.R. 7321 (AIFRA)]” (White House
2008).
In broad terms, TARP authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase “troubled
assets”22 from “financial institutions.”23 The statutory definitions are descriptive rather

TARP also provided residual discretion to the Secretary of the Treasury to determine what troubled assets
fit within the statute’s definitions. The situation demonstrates that considering the unknown when crafting
crisis legislation can be a very useful practice. While criticized by some government, industry, and academic
commentators, overall, negative commentary regarding the use of TARP funds for the auto industry appears
to have been minimal. In some respects, this is consistent with a tradition of affording great deference to the
executive in interpreting statutes (COP 2009b, 76–78) and much latitude to the government in times of crisis.
See for example, Friedman (2012) where, although not discussing a financial crisis, he does argue that the
President’s authority to protect the country in a variety of emergencies (terrorist attacks, environmental
disasters, health emergencies) is broad and that “the Supreme Court has historically supported the
Executive‘s decisions and independent powers in emergency scenarios” (273). Also, “According to Justice
Thomas, “[t]he power to protect the [n]ation ought to exist without limitation because it is impossible to
foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the
means which may be necessary to satisfy them” (274). Posner (2012) also discusses, in the context of the
September 11 terrorists’ attacks, the “deference thesis [which] states that during emergencies the legislature
and judiciary should defer to the executive” (214). A move like this about-face is bound to invite scrutiny from
oversight bodies, politicians, and public pundits. However, officials can prepare for this by consulting counsel,
carefully following any applicable procedures supporting the decisions, creating a credible record of the
analysis underlying the original and reversed decisions, and preparing to address questions about the change
in position.
22 TARP defines “troubled assets” as “(A) residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations,
or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each case was originated or
issued on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase of which the Secretary determines promotes financial
market stability; and (B) any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which is
necessary to promote financial market stability, but only upon transmittal of such determination, in writing,
to the appropriate committees of Congress” (12 USC 5202, Section 3[9]).
23 The relevant TARP definition of ‘‘financial institution’’ is: “any institution, including, but not limited to, any
bank, savings association, credit union, security broker or dealer, or insurance company, established and
regulated under the laws of the United States or any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Guam,
American Samoa, or the United States Virgin Islands, and having significant operations in the United States,
21
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than restrictive. In particular, although auto manufacturers are not mentioned in the
definition of financial institutions, such a company arguably is included as an “institution, . .
. established and regulated under the laws of the United States or any State territory or
possession” (12 USC 5202, Section 3[5]). The definition of “troubled assets” encompasses
certain mortgage and mortgage related securities, but can be expanded by determination of
the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with certain procedures set out in the statute
which include consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and transmission of
decision to appropriate committees of Congress named in the statute (12 USC 5202, Section
3(9)(b)).
Paulson’s statement accompanying the announcement of the auto relief addressed the
issue in a limited manner:
Treasury will make these loans using authority provided for the Troubled Asset
Relief Program. While the purpose of this program and the enabling legislation is to
stabilize our financial sector, the authority allows us to take this action. Absent
congressional action, no other authorities existed to stave off a disorderly
bankruptcy of one or more auto companies” (Paulson 2008a).
In authorizing the use of TARP funds to assist the auto industry, Treasury counsel and
Secretary Paulson relied on the nexus of the auto manufacturers with their financing
companies to determine, in accordance with the requirements of TARP, that:
(1) “such thrift and other holding companies engaged in the manufacturing of
automotive vehicles and the provision of credit and financing in connection with
the manufacturing and purchase of such vehicles are ‘financial institutions,’” and
(2) that the obligations of such companies “are financial instruments the purchase of
which is necessary to promote stability to the financial system of the United States,
and, as such are ‘troubled assets’ as that term is defined in Section 3(9)(B) of the
Act, and eligible to be purchased under TARP” (Paulson 2008a).
Once President Barack Obama had been sworn in, his Treasury Secretary, Timothy
Geithner, issued a “Determination” that was substantially similar to the one Secretary
Paulson had issued, except that it referenced the AIFP and seemed to shift away slightly
from the nexus with the auto financing companies, eliminating any reference to them as a
basis for the use of TARP funds for the AIFP (Geithner 2009b). This decision to use TARP
funds for the AIFP, which was criticized by some, is further discussed in detail in Key
Design Decision No. 3.

but excluding any central bank of, or institution owned by, a foreign government” (12 USC 5202, Section
3[5]).
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Without government assistance, the likely outcome was that the companies would be
liquidated in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy process, which everyone thought would be very
disruptive (Deese, Shafran, and Jester 2020, 360–361). In deciding to provide funding to
the manufacturers in December 2008, the Bush administration, for the time being at least,
rejected bankruptcy as an available option. Factors influencing this decision were, (1) the
companies’ lack of preparation for a traditional Chapter 11 reorganization, (2) the
prolonged nature of such a bankruptcy proceeding, and (3) the possible unavailability of
private debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing (Deese, Shafran, and Jester 2020, 364; Klier
and Rubenstein 2012, 7–9, 21).
Also of importance was the possible impact of such a sudden collapse, as a White House
spokesperson stated at the time: “A precipitous collapse of this industry would have a
severe impact on our economy, and it would be irresponsible to further weaken and
destabilize our economy at this time” (Canis et al. 2009, 9). The White House estimated that
a failure of GM and Chrysler would in the short-term “result in a more than one-percent
reduction in real GDP growth and about 1.1 million workers losing their jobs, including
workers from auto suppliers and dealers” (White House 2008; Paulson 2010, 424). And
there was concern that there might be a panic that would risk further destabilization to the
shared parts supplier network and other manufacturers (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 11;
Deese, Shafran, and Jester 2020, 361; COP 2011, 10-11). The possible sizable costs on
various levels of government through the need for additional spending on safety net, health
care, unemployment insurance, and pension rescues as a result of the companies’ failures
was also considered (Deese, Shafran, and Jester 2020, 363–364; Goolsbee and Krueger
2015, 8–91).

II.

Program Description

Assistance to General Motors
The Bridge Loan
On December 19, 2008, President Bush announced that the government would provide up
to $13.4 billion in TARP-funded secured short-term loans to GM (the GM Bridge Loan). A
portion, $9.4 billion, was to be lent immediately and a second tranche of $4 billion would
be released in February 2009 if the second tranche of TARP funding was made available
and if the company met certain conditions (White House 2008). The government later lent
GM an additional $6.4 billion under the same loan agreement.
Funds from the GM Bridge Loan were to be used by GM to become “financially viable,”
subject to a number of restructuring and burden-sharing conditions that were similar to
terms that had been supported or considered by Congress in its failed efforts to pass
targeted funding legislation (White House 2008). The funding was secured by GM’s assets
(some of which were already encumbered, so the government acquired only a secondary
lien), carried a below-market interest rate (the greater of the three-month LIBOR plus 3%
and 5%), and would expire on March 31, 2009, unless specific terms were met (Nye 2022b,
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8). The funding, along with loans to Chrysler and other industry parties, would come to be
known as the Automobile Industry Financing Program (AIFP).24
Warrants and Additional Notes. Under the law that created TARP, Treasury was mandated
to receive some type of warrant or other additional security as consideration for funds
lent.25 The warrants were designed to have the taxpayers share in the upside of GM’s
recovery, which they would fund. There was precedent for such a provision in the 1970s’
rescue of Chrysler; the government realized a profit when it auctioned off its warrants after
the stock price recovered.26 However, warrants protect taxpayers only if the business does
not fail, if there is a market for them, or if the stock price exceeds the warrant exercise
price.
The warrant and additional security issued pursuant to the GM Bridge Loan were more
complex than other TARP programs in that the government received both warrants and
additional security in the form of additional promissory notes (“Additional Notes”), which
were a feature in all of the government’s loans to GM and Chrysler.
In the case of GM, which was publicly traded, Treasury received a warrant to purchase
common shares equal to 20% of the government’s loan commitment (the $13.4 billion
“Maximum Loan Amount”). However, the Bridge Loan prohibited Treasury from acquiring
more than 19.99% of GM’s total common equity prior to the exercise of the warrants,
largely to avoid the need to consolidate GM onto the government’s balance sheet27
(Treasury 2008; GM and Treasury 2008, 1; White House 2008). If Treasury was prohibited
The Bridge Loans for Chrysler and GM were announced before the details of the AIFP, which would become
the overall support program for assistance to the auto industry, were published. When published, on
December 31, 2008, the details of the AIFP described the broad parameters that the government would
reference in determining assistance to the industry. By then, the first GM loan had already been executed and
the term sheets for this loan and the Chrysler loan had been available for at least a week. Although preceding
the published AIFP guidelines, the initial GM and Chrysler loans do appear to largely comply with them.
25 See EESA 2008, Sec. 113(d). This requirement emerged from various lessons learned from bailouts of the
late 1970s. Namely, that the government could obtain risk compensation for its aid through equity
participation; for example, receiving warrants.
26 In its earlier rescue of Chrysler, in the late 1970s, the government, which had guaranteed certain Chrysler
borrowing and received warrants for 14.4 million shares of common stock in connection with its assistance,
ultimately sold the warrants back to the company for $311 million at auction, resulting in a profit for
taxpayers (Wilson 2009, 4). In December 2008, in a hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senator Tom Carper expressed support for the government’s receiving warrants
under the Bridge Loan but expressed concern regarding the mechanism because Chrysler was not privately
traded company: “how do we do warrants with Chrysler in this situation or something akin to warrants so
that we have a reasonable return for the taxpayers in light of our willingness to take on this risk?” (Senate
Banking Committee 2008, 86).
27 Under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), if the government owned 20% or more of a
company’s stock, it would be considered as controlling and would have to consolidate that company’s assets
and liabilities onto its balance sheet. The creative structuring of limiting the warrant and compensating the
treasury with an Additional Note avoids this result and allows the government to avoid consolidating GM’s
huge balance sheet..
24
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from exercising the full amount of the warrants, GM would provide it an additional
promissory note (the Additional Note) equal to 6.67% of the Maximum Loan Amount
minus one-third the value of the common shares Treasury had received on the exercise of
the warrants (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 2).
GM also issued additional warrants and Additional Notes to Treasury each time the Bridge
Loan agreement was amended to increase the Maximum Loan Amount (two successive
amendments to the GM loans increased the amount by $2 billion and $4.4 billion,
respectively) (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 300–321). The warrants and Additional Notes
were effectively the only financial security, beyond the interest payments, that the
government received in return for extending the term of and the authorized amount loaned
to GM (GM LSA 2008, PDF pp. 300–321, 329).
In the end, Treasury did not exercise the warrants. Following formation of “New GM,” the
corporation that purchased most of GM’s assets in the Section 363 sale and continued its
business, the original $13.4 billion bridge loan and the $6 billion working capital loan were
terminated (discussed in “The Viability Plan and Working Capital Loan” later in this
section), including the associated warrants and Additional Notes. In consideration of these
amounts and the $19.9 billion GM DIP Loan (discussed in “The Restructuring and Debtorin-Possession Financing” later in this section) the US government received approximately
60.8% of the equity of New GM, which is a standard treatment of debtholders in a
bankruptcy action (COP 2011, 30). In this case, it is also consistent with the TARP provision
that called for additional security in connection with government loans.
Limits on Executive Compensation. In addition, because the GM Bridge Loan was funded
from TARP, GM was subject to restrictions regarding the compensation of its top five
executives28 (Canis et al. 2009, 67–68). Broadly, the company had to ensure that executives
(1) did not take unnecessary and excessive risks that threatened the value of the company,
(2) were subject to provisions that allowed for the company’s recovery or the claw back of
any bonus or incentive compensation paid to them that was based on inaccurate financial
statements, and (3) were not allowed to receive golden parachute payments from the
company during the time in which the Treasury held an equity stake in the company (Canis
et al. 2009, 51, 68, 74).
Other Terms. The GM Bridge Loan was also guaranteed by GM’s subsidiaries and provided
that any successor to GM had to stand as a guarantor, effectively prohibiting the sale of GM
away from the obligations (Canis et al. 2009, 53–54).

These provisions were contained in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA 2009,
P.L. 111-5), which was signed on February 17, 2009. ARRA’s section on executive privileges and
compensation for recipients of TARP assistance amended and replaces Section 111(b) of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA 2008) and subsequent Treasury Department interpretive
guidelines (Canis et al. 2009, 68).
28
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In an effort to further protect taxpayers, the Bridge Loan also provided that in the case of
the company’s bankruptcy, the government would be permitted to convert the Bridge Loan
to Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing (Canis et al. 2009, 54).
DIP financing provides the debtor-in-possession in a bankruptcy case with sufficient funds
to meet continuing expenses while the business is either reorganized or liquidated.
Generally, DIP financing is usually a post-petition obligation that enjoys an extremely high
priority. A bankruptcy court can authorize a debtor to grant liens to the DIP lender that are
senior to liens of all the pre-bankruptcy creditors. In theory, Treasury’s ability to convert
the bridge loans to DIP loans would enable it to maintain, or increase, the likelihood of
repayment from the bankruptcy estate protecting the taxpayers’ investment (Canis et al.
2009, 54).
However, the Congressional Research Service concluded that this conversion provision
would go against the very purpose of DIP loans, and even the key tenets of the bankruptcy
process, which require that senior creditors be paid before junior creditors (Canis et al.
2009, 54). The converted Bridge/DIP loans would not provide GM or Chrysler with
additional working capital, they would keep the bankruptcy court from relieving the debtor
of its pre-bankruptcy debts, and they would negatively impact other creditors. Ultimately,
the Bridge Loans were not converted to DIP loans, but Treasury did provide new DIP
funding to both companies with Export Development Canada, Canada’s export credit
agency (COP 2009b, 23–31). (See discussion in “The Restructuring and Debtor-in-Possession
Financing” and “Assistance to Chrysler: The Restructuring and Debtor-in-Possession
Financing” in this section.)
The Viability Plan and Working Capital Loan
GM had originally submitted a restructuring plan when it first appealed to Congress for
funding. The plan was largely viewed as inadequate but did form the basis for the
administration’s decision to require the company to submit a “viability plan” by February
28, 2009, as a condition for receiving the GM Bridge Loan (White House 2008). The
viability plan had to include operational changes that demonstrated a path to long-term
viability. The administration specifically called for significant concessions from creditors
and labor29 (White House 2008). The plan was to be reviewed by the President’s designee,
but when President Bush failed to appoint a designee, the job fell to Treasury Secretary

Requiring the viability plan was quite consequential. It was noted by the Congressional Oversight Panel
(COP) that financial companies, some which had received significantly more funding than the auto
manufacturers would, had not been subjected to such a requirement. The plans provided another way for the
government to monitor the manufacturers’ use of funds and progress; both the plans and the government’s
(sometimes unfavorable) evaluation of them were released publicly. Arguably, the public nature of these
plans assisted in the manufacturers’ required negotiations with various parties (debtholders, suppliers,
unions, etc.), in which the government also played a role. See discussion at Key Design Decision Nos. 7 and 8.
29
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Paulson; President Obama would assign this responsibility to an Auto Task Force.30 If the
submitted viability plan was found to be unsatisfactory, the Bridge Loan could be called.
The loan could also be extended at the government’s discretion (White House 2008).
The viability plan GM submitted in February was determined to be unsatisfactory.
Nevertheless, after its evaluation, the government concluded that “because of GM’s scale,
franchise and progress to date, we believe that there could be a viable business within GM
if the company and its stakeholders engage in a substantially more aggressive restructuring
plan” (White House 2009a). Therefore, on March 31, 2009, the government announced that
it was providing GM with working capital (the “working capital loan”) in an unstated
amount for 60 days to buy it time to develop a more robust plan (Treasury 2009c). At the
same time, the administration announced that GM CEO Rick Waggoner was stepping aside
and signaled that bankruptcy might be a necessary tool that could be used “in a quick and
surgical way” to effectuate a restructuring31 (Treasury 2009c). The amount of working
capital extended to GM would ultimately total $6 billion (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF pp.
301–319).
In the interim months, Treasury officials assisted GM to varying degrees in negotiating
concessions with its major creditors and labor unions. In April, GM submitted a revised
viability plan, which the Treasury characterized as one that “rework[ed] its business plan,
accelerate[d] its operational restructuring and ma[de] far greater reductions in its
outstanding liabilities” than GM’s previous plan (Treasury 2009e). Further, the government
stated that the company had “also secured commitments of meaningful sacrifice from all of
its major stakeholder groups, sacrifices sufficient for this plan to proceed forward”
(Treasury 2009e).
The Restructuring and Debtor-in-Possession Financing
As a result of the acceptability of the viability plan, the government determined to provide
additional assistance to GM to help it restructure. On Sunday, May 31, 2009, the Treasury
announced that GM would file for bankruptcy the following day (Treasury 2009e). In a
speech from the White House on Monday morning, President Obama indicated that GM
would undergo a bankruptcy restructuring similar to that which Chrysler was just about to

The AIFP called for the President to appoint a designee to oversee the government’s assistance to the auto
industry. President Obama chose not to appoint a single individual as designee but instead created the
President’s Auto Task Force to administration this role. For further discussion, see “The Presidential Task
Force on the Auto Industry.”
31 By including the possibility of bankruptcy in this early notice, the administration may have sought to (1)
favorably influence the negotiations with interested parties such as creditors and the unions, (2) prepare
shareholders, creditors and the markets for the possibility of bankruptcy, especially since it may have
appeared that this option had been dismissed in light of the government’s intervention, and (3) to diffuse
possible negative reactions.
30
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complete32 (Obama 2009b). The process would occur under Section 363 of the US
Bankruptcy Code. The expedited process would (1) allow GM to sell substantially all of its
assets to a newly formed corporation (“New GM”) that would continue to operate the
business, (2) give consideration to certain of its creditors in provisions of the sale, and (3)
confirm a liquidation plan under Chapter 11 to wind down what remained of the company
(“Old GM”) (Bosco and Plante 2013, 183, 186).
In a traditional Chapter 11 process, a committee of creditors negotiates a plan of
liquidation or restructuring and then all creditors vote on the plan. This process can take
substantial time and also generate significant administrative fees. A Section 363 sale allows
debtors to “use, sell, or lease” property of the estate “other than in the ordinary course of
business” before the formalization of a plan of liquidation or reorganization, including the
sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets (Neyland and St. John 2022, 3) The sale is
subject to court approval and the purchaser acquires such assets “free and clear” of any
liens. A sale may be approved and proceed despite creditor disagreement, and there are
limited challenges a creditor can make against the sale. Because of the expedited nature of
a Section 363 sale, the bankrupt estate is prevented from realizing some or all of the
benefits that may accrue from holding onto the assets; as some investments may generate
positive returns in the period in which a plan is negotiated, this may be particularly
detrimental to claimants, such as shareholders that benefit from any asset appreciation
(Neyland and St. John 2022, 4–8).
Both timeliness and costs were factors considered by the company, government, and
creditors in analyzing and deciding upon the proposed GM Section 363 sale (Bosco and
Plante 2013, 183, 186). GM filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York with
an expedited timeline of approximately six weeks, due to be completed by July 10, 2009. It
was one of the largest bankruptcies of a US manufacturer in history (GMC 2009a; Bosco
and Plante 2013, 186).
In conjunction with GM’s restructuring, and because such financing was not available to GM
commercially, the US government agreed to provide DIP financing of up to $30.1 billion to
assist the company in going through the expedited Section 363 bankruptcy action to clear
its liabilities and restructure (Treasury 2009e; Dassin 2009, 7–8). The governments of
Canada and the province of Ontario also committed a loan, up to $9.5 billion, to GM and
New GM (COP 2011, 21). See “Program Description: Canadian Participation in Assistance to
Manufacturers” for more discussion of the role of Canada.

See discussion at “Program Description: Assistance to Chrysler: The Restructuring and Debtor-inPossession Financing” and Nye 2021 for details of the Chrysler bankruptcy and restructuring. The Auto Task
Force and Treasury Auto Team determined that Chrysler, the smaller company, should go through the Section
363 process first as a test case. (Deese, Shafran and Jester 2020, 373-375).
32
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Figure 2: US Government Support to GM ($ billions)
Item

Amount

Bridge Loan a

$13.4

Working Capital Loansb

6.4

DIP Financingc

30.1

Total to GM

$49.9

Amount recovered

39.7

Profit/(loss)

(10.2)

(a) Amounts include any Additional Notes issued but exclude Canadian governments’ participation of
$9.5 billion.
(b) Includes an additional $361 million loan that GM repaid.
(c) Reflects maximum amount committed by the government.
Sources: Treasury n.d.b; Treasury 2009e; Treasury 2013b; COP 2011, 35–36.

The bankruptcy process wiped out the value of GM’s equity shares, and its debt obligations
were restructured. As part of the process, the company committed to a plan to achieve and
sustain long-term viability by making major changes in the areas of (1) reducing average
employee pay to bring it more in line with the foreign transplants, (2) off-loading
unprofitable brands, and (3) committing to international competitiveness and energy
efficient vehicles (COP 2009a; 21–27, 68–77).
As a result of the bankruptcy, ownership in the post-bankruptcy New GM was shared
between Treasury, GM’s creditors, the governments of Canada and the province of Ontario,
and the Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association (VEBA) of the United Auto Workers
(UAW) union (which would absorb certain health care liabilities) as set forth in Figure 3.

320

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 1

Figure 3: Ownership of New GM Post-restructuring and Other Equity Interests
Owner
Treasury*

Equity Stake

Preferred
Stock

Warrants

# of Directors party may
appoint

60.80%

$2.1 billion

n/a

10
1

UAW VEBA

17.50%

$6.5 billion

One warrant for 2.5%
common stock once valuation
hit $75 billion

Canada and
Ontario

11.70%

$400 million

n/a

n/a

Two warrants for 7.5%
common stock each at
discounted price once
valuation hit $15 billion

Old GM
(unsecured
bondholders)

10.0%

The UAW VEBA Trust has
the right to select one
independent director, but no
right to vote its shares nor
any other governance rights.
1

1

Note: Sources report that there were 13 directors. We have assigned 1 to the Old GM unsecured bondholders,
as we cannot confirm another holder of this spot. The other places were independently confirmed.
Sources: Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 42; Gerber 2009, 18–19; Bosco and Plante 2013, 185–186; COP 2009b, 15–
16, 24.

Following formation of the New GM, the original $13.4 billion bridge loan and the $6.0
billion working capital loan were terminated, including the associated warrants and
additional notes. In consideration of these amounts and $19.9 billion of the GM DIP Loan,
the US government received approximately 60.8% of the equity of New GM (COP 2011, 8,
23). It chose to swap the existing loans for equity rather than weigh down New GM with
substantial debt, which might have negatively impacted New GM’s prospects, a standard
practice in bankruptcy actions. Treasury also received approximately $7.1 billion in debt
(including the $360 million liabilities for customer warranties) and $2.1 billion in preferred
stock in New GM. Treasury had the right to appoint the initial directors of New GM, other
than those to be selected by the VEBA and the Canadian governments (COP 2009b, 20).
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Assistance to Chrysler
The Bridge Loan
On December 19, 2008, the day the government announced the GM Bridge Loan, it also
announced that it had determined to provide a loan to Chrysler (the Chrysler Bridge Loan).
The terms of the $4 billion Chrysler Bridge Loan, all of which was disbursed shortly
thereafter, were very similar to those of the GM Bridge Loan. It was secured by Chrysler’s
assets (although its unencumbered assets were minimal), carried a below-market interest
rate (the greater of three-month LIBOR plus 3% and 5%), and it also required the company
to submit a viability plan by February 20, 2009 (Chrysler 2008, PDF pp. 26, 143–145). The
Chrysler Bridge Loan was for a period of three years but subject to early termination in the
event of default or if the company failed to timely submit an acceptable viability plan
(Chrysler 2008, PDF pp. 8, 25 ,60; GM and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 258–262).
For reasons related to Chrysler’s private status—both that of the existing company (Old
Chrysler) and the company that purchased most of Chrysler’s assets in the section 363
bankruptcy and continued to operate under the Chrysler name, New Chrysler—warrants
were not considered a desirable option, so Additional Notes were issued as the additional
security required under TARP. Treasury received a similar amount in Additional Notes, as
it had in the GM case, representing 6.67% of the “Maximum Loan Amount” of the loan (in
other words, the $4 billion committed to Chrysler) (Chrysler 2008, PDF p. 142). This meant
that Chrysler would owe approximately $4.3 billion in principal on the $4 billion Bridge
Loan.
The Viability Plan and Working Capital Loan
As required, in February 2009, Chrysler submitted a viability plan. However, after
evaluation, on March 30 the Obama administration announced a position that was very
different than the one it reached regarding GM. The administration rejected Chrysler’s
viability plan and “determined that Chrysler has not demonstrated that it can achieve longterm viability as a stand-alone company,” as required (Treasury 2009c, 3). The
administration also concluded that Chrysler’s proffered plan to merge with Italian auto
manufacturer Fiat Automobiles SpA was not sufficiently developed to support further
taxpayer investment (Treasury 2009c, 1). Despite this conclusion, the government was
willing to extend additional working capital to Chrysler for 30 days to see if it could, among
other things, solidify a merger arrangement with Fiat that met certain financial constraints
and adequately protected taxpayers (Treasury 2009c, 1, 3–4).
In more detail, the requirements to be met included: (1) restructuring Chrysler’s balance
sheet to extinguish the vast majority of its secured debt and all of its unsecured debt and
equity, other than to trade creditors; (2) further concessions from the UAW; (3) a more
viable plan for profitably operating in a normal business environment; (4) an agreed plan
with Fiat that would not require more than $6 billion of taxpayer investment to be
successful; (5) a viable mechanism for dealer and customer financing; and (6) a “credible
plan” for implementing the restructuring (Treasury 2009c, 4).
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If the company was successful with these steps in the allotted 30-day period, the
government would consider extending to it up to $6 billion in additional funds as requested
in its viability plan to help the partnership succeed. However, President Obama and the
Treasury also clearly stated that if Chrysler could not reach an acceptable agreement with
Fiat and its stakeholders, “we will not be able to justify investing additional tax dollars to
keep Chrysler in business” (Obama 2009a). The President also stated that bankruptcy
might be a useful tool to assist Chrysler in any restructuring so as to permit it to quickly get
to a fresh start. (Obama 2009a).
Following the March 30 announcement, the government assisted Chrysler in negotiating
concessions from its major creditors and labor unions (Nye 2022b, 8–9), and in firming up
the terms of the Fiat partnership. After review of Chrysler’s revised viability plan, on April
30, 2009, the government announced, concomitant with its announcement regarding GM’s
restructuring initiative, that Chrysler had successfully sealed a merger deal with Fiat and
satisfied sufficient other terms to support the government in providing additional support
of its restructuring (Treasury 2009e, 1).
Figure 4: US Government Support to Chrysler ($ billions)a
Item

Amount

Chrysler Bridge Loan

$4.0

DIP Financingb

3.8

Loan to New Chryslerc

4.6

Total to Chrysler

$12.4

Amount recovered

11.2

Profit/(loss)

(1.2)

(a) Includes any Additional Notes issued but excludes Canadian governments’ participation of approximately
$1.1 billion.
(b) The government committed up to $3.8 billion, of which New Chrysler drew $1.9 billion.
(c) The Treasury originally committed up to $6.6 billion to New Chrysler; of this amount, the company drew
$4.58 billion, a figure which the Treasury used in later calculations of loss on the Chrysler transactions.
Sources: Treasury 2013b; Treasury 2009a; COP 2011, 51.

In the proposed merger with Fiat, the Italian company would contribute its operating and
design expertise to the merger, agreed to continue to manufacture vehicles in the US, and
be prohibited from increasing its ownership in the new company until Treasury ended its
investment (Treasury 2009e, 1). Fiat would also largely manage the new company.
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The Restructuring and Debtor-in-Possession Financing
Because Chrysler had been unable to secure a compromise agreement from all its creditors,
Chrysler would restructure through a Section 363 bankruptcy process, and the government
intended for it to proceed with the action prior to the larger GM bankruptcy, in effect,
positioning the smaller company as a test case (Treasury 2009e, 1). As with GM, the
bankruptcy would enable the company to sell substantially all of its operating assets to a
newly formed corporation (“New Chrysler”) and discharge substantially all of its liabilities,
which would remain with the old company (“Old Chrysler”), which was to be wound down
and liquidated under a Chapter 11 proceeding. Some of Chrysler’s creditors were also given
consideration in provisions of the sale (Bosco and Plante 2013, 18386). Additionally,
through the bankruptcy, the value of Old Chrysler’s equity shares was wiped out. Creditors
were compromised and would receive payout from the proceeds of the liquidated estate,
including the proceeds from the Section 363 sale, as the Chapter 11 process proceeded.
Because, as with GM, commercial DIP financing was not available to Chrysler, the US
government committed up to $3.8 billion in DIP financing to Chrysler for the bankruptcy
process to proceed (Treasury 2013b). Old Chrysler eventually accessed $1.9 billion from
Treasury (Treasury 2013b) and an additional C$1.3 billion (approximately $1.1 billion33)
from Canadian authorities (OAGC 2014, 9). The US commitment terminated on June 30,
2009. Treasury wrote off the entire $1.9 billion in DIP financing but ultimately recovered
$160 million through the sale over time of the remaining collateral held by Old Chrysler
(Treasury 2013b). Information on Export Development Canada (EDC)’s recovery from its
DIP lending commitments was unavailable.
Treasury also committed to lend $6.6 billion to New Chrysler34 (the “New Chrysler loan”) to
assist in funding its operations, a loan that was also secured by substantially all of the
company’s assets. Chrysler ultimately drew $4.6 billion on this facility (COP 2009a, 40, 50;
Treasury 2009e). The loan took the form of a “term loan for working capital with $2.1
billion due in 30 months and the balance 50% due on the 7th anniversary and 50% due on
the 8th anniversary of the loan” (Treasury 2009e).
As additional consideration for the New Chrysler loan, Treasury received from New
Chrysler 9.85% of its common stock (COP 2009b 27). As shown in Figure 5 the other postpetition owners of New Chrysler were: (1) the UAW VEBA which received 68% of New
Chrysler’s equity for agreeing to restructure its $8.8 billion in unsecured claims against
Chrysler, cutting Chrysler’s health care costs by more than 40% in the process (Rattner
2011, 153–154, 157); (2) Fiat, which received 20% for its contributions to the new

Per Yahoo Finance, USD 1 = CAD 0.8516 on May 5, 2009.
Of the Chrysler Bridge Loan, $500 million was also rolled into the New Chrysler loan. In addition, New
Chrysler assumed $1.9 billion of that loan, and Treasury effectively wrote off $1.6 billion of the original $4
billion bridge loan (COP 2011, 10–11, 39).
33
34
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company (COP 2009b 27); and (3) the Canadian and Ontario governments for their
financial participation, received 2.46 percent (COP 2009b 27).
Figure 5: Post-Bankruptcy Ownership of New Chrysler
Owner

Common
Stock
(%)

Other Equity Interests

No. of
Directors
that Party
May Elect

UAW VEBA

67.69

n/a

1

FIAT

20.00

Two warrants for 7.5% common stock
each at discounted price once valuation
hit $15 billion

3

US Treasury

9.85

n/a

4

Canadian/Ontario
governments

2.46

n/a

1

Source: Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 41; COP 2009b, 11.

Chrysler entered bankruptcy on April 30, 2009, and New Chrysler exited on June 10, 2009
(David 2010, 39). New Chrysler, which would essentially be run by Fiat, began with $33
billion in assets and $29 billion in liabilities (Chrysler 2011, 326).
The agreements among the post-bankruptcy owners and the company contained several
provisions that provided opportunities for Fiat to increase its ownership as incentives to
pursue the company’s new business plan. Treasury’s stake was diluted in the first half of
2011 from 9.85% to 8.6% when Fiat, having met certain performance milestones,
automatically increased its stake in the company from 20% to 30% and also exercised an
equity call option to purchase an additional 16% interest in New Chrysler. In July 2011,
Fiat, through exercise of another equity call option, purchased Treasury’s shares for $500
million and paid an additional $60 million relating to rights that Treasury held with respect
to the VEBA’s equity interests; which it did not have funding to acquire (Treasury 2011).
Thus, while the receipt of equity anticipated that the Treasury and taxpayers might benefit
from appreciation in New Chrysler’s stock price post-bankruptcy, such benefit was limited
when compared with the results at GM due to the size of the government’s interest and the
decision to use equity as an incentive for Fiat to succeed at the merger and availability of
funds.
The Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry
The GM and Chrysler Bridge Loans provided that a President’s Designee (who would be the
Secretary of Treasury if the President did not appoint a Designee) would administer the
loans, review, and evaluate the companies’ viability plans, and oversee compliance
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(Chrysler 2008, PDF pp. 19, 58-61, 68). The enabling law provided for a single President’s
Designee; however, the President Bush declined to appoint a designee and therefore the
role initially fell to Secretary of the Treasury Paulson (Rattner 2011, 32–35).
On February 15, 2009, before the manufacturers’ viability plans were submitted, President
Obama announced that the role of President’s Designee would be filled by the Presidential
Task Force on the Auto Industry (the Task Force), perhaps in response to some negative
public opinion regarding a “car czar” (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 49-50; Rattner 2011, 32–
33, 51–56, 63–66). The Task Force was co-chaired by Secretary of the Treasury Geithner,
and director of the National Economic Council Lawrence Summers (Klier and Rubenstein
2012, 38–39; COP 2009b, 10–11). However, day-to-day administration of the Bridge Loans
and other funding and staffing for the Task Force fell to the Treasury auto team (Auto
Team), which was led by two appointed advisers, Ron Bloom and Steven Rattner35 (COP
2009b, 10-11; Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 38–39). The Auto Team reported to the Task
Force and its co-chairs, who then reported up to the President (COP 2009b, 10–11)
The Task Force enjoyed wide-ranging administrative leverage over the restructuring
process through its ability to review a number of company actions and its power to trigger
the loans’ termination by determining the acceptability of the companies’ viability plans
(Chrysler 2008, PDF pp. 19, 58–61, 68). Specifically, the Task Force had the authority to
approve bonuses to senior employees, reject transactions of more than $100 million,
approve material changes to the company expense policy, generally oversee compliance
with the terms of the loans, and negotiate the terms of any further assistance (Chrysler
2008, PDF pp. 19, 41, 53–61).
Canadian Participation in Assistance to Manufacturers
The Canadian operations of both GM and Chrysler were highly integrated with the
companies’ US operations. “Approximately 85 percent of cars produced in Canada [were]
exported, and these exports [were] sent almost exclusively to the United States. Exported
vehicles and parts represent[ed] about 15 percent of Canada’s manufactured product
exports” (OAGC 2014, 3). Moreover, the Canadian supplier network was integrated
similarly to that in the US, with suppliers also supporting healthier manufacturers with a
risk of contagion if any of these suppliers were to fail due to GM’s or Chrysler’s demise. The
developing economic impacts of the financial crisis negatively affected Canada’s auto
production and employment in ways similar to the effects in the US, including slower sales
and increased difficulty in financing (OAGC 2014, 4). As the industry accounted for

Ron Bloom was a former investment banker and adviser to the president of the United Steelworkers union,
and Steven Rattner was the co-founder of the Quadrangle Group, a private equity firm. The auto team was
“was notable for not including any individual with close ties to the auto industry” (Klier and Rubenstein 2012,
39). Rattner exited the Treasury Auto Team on July 13, 2009, leaving Bloom as the team’s leader (COP 2009b,
10–11)
35
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approximately 1.5 percent of the Canadian gross domestic product in 2007, the
government wanted to forestall any further ill effects (OAGC 2014, 1–6).
Therefore, in late 2008, the Canadian federal and Ontario provincial governments became
concerned about the impact that a GM or Chrysler failure would have on their economies
and in 2009 joined the US government in offering financial assistance to Chrysler Canada
and GM Canada, subsidiaries of the US companies, through participation in the US
government’s agreements with the parent companies.
Canada’s investments in GM, targeted to ensure continued production in Canada totaled
C$13.7 billion with C$10.8 billion going to GM companies and C$2.9 billion going to
Chrysler companies as shown in Figure 836 (OAGC 2014, 9; GM 2010, 55). The Canadian
governments also participated in negotiations with stakeholders prior to the bankruptcy
filings with a focus on maintaining production in Canada.
A portion of the loans to GM Canada, $1.5 billion, was repayable and was repaid (OAGC
2014, 12). The parties agreed that the majority of loans made by the federal and provincial
governments, valued at approximately C$9.8 billion, would be converted into 16million
preferred shares and 175 million common shares of New GM (OAGC 2014, 12). The
Canadian governments also received the right to select one director of New GM as long as
they held their equity (COP 2009b, 20).
In 2014, the Canadian government transferred approximately 37 million common shares to
Ontario. The government sold the remaining common shares in a series of transactions
between 2013 and 2015 and reported that it recognized gains in value of C$4.3 billion from
the common shares (CDEV 2016, 2). On December 31, 2014, GM repurchased the preferred
shares at the liquidation preference value of $25 per share (USD) for a total of C$466,989
(CDEV 2016, 33).
As shown in Figure 5 and discussed in the “Program Description: Assistance to Chrysler”
section the Canadian governments also provided assistance to the Chrysler companies with
a loan of C$1.6 billion to Canada Chrysler and of $1.3 billion to Old Chrysler. The loan to
Chrysler was converted into 2.46 percent of New Chrysler’s common shares and the right
to select one director as long as they held the equity (see Figure 5; COP 2009b 27).
Information on the further recovery of the Canadian loans or the outcome of the New
Chrysler shares was unavailable at this writing.

The federal and provincial governments agreed to provide two-thirds and one-third, respectively, of the
Canadian share of assistance to the companies (OAGC 2014, 5). Canadian investments were made through
Export Development Canada (EDC), Canada’s export credit agency, on behalf of the governments of Canada
and the Province of Ontario (COP 2009b, 28, 159).
36
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Figure 6: Total Loans to Chrysler and General Motors from Canada and Ontario

Source: OAGC 2014, exhibit 5.3.

In addition, in 2008, the Canadian government established the Automotive Innovation
Fund which was designed to provide up to C$250 billion over five years to eligible
automotive, engineering, and research firms to support “strategic, large-scale research and
development (R&D) projects to build innovative, greener, more fuel-efficient vehicles” and
the competitiveness of the Canadian automotive industry (Canada n.d.).
Assistance to Related Segments of the Auto Industry
Assistance to Auto Finance Companies
GMAC/Ally Financial. Over 2008 and 2009, Treasury invested $17.2 billion in GMAC equity,
and the company was approved to convert to a bank holding company on an expedited
basis, after which it participated in broad-based programs of the Federal Reserve (the
Term Auction Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, and the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility [TALF]) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (the
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program) (Ally Financial 2011, 37; Treasury n.d.d; Federal
Reserve 2008). Also of note, an expansion of the TALF,37 which provided financing for ABS,
including those backed by auto loans, was designed to help restore liquidity to GMAC’s auto
The TALF had been introduced on November 25, 2008, by the Federal Reserve with TARP backing from the
Treasury and was designed to encourage lending to businesses and households, the issuance of securities
backed by privately originated loans to consumers and businesses, and to improve market conditions for
asset-backed securities, including those backed by auto loans (GAO 2009b, 33). Under the program, the Fed
provided financing to investors to purchase new issues of eligible ABS, including small business loans, auto
loans, student loans, and credit card loans. (GAO 2009b, 33). Up to $1 trillion in lending was authorized with
up to $100 billion coming from TARP. (GAO 2009b, 33).
37
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finance business.38 Although there was some concern that the TALF’s required triple-A
rating would exclude some securities of the auto finance companies, GMAC successfully
utilized the program. For example, it reported that for the first quarter of 2010, of six
transactions securitizing more than $5 billion of automotive-related assets, all but one for
$909 million were offered under TALF (GAO 2009b, 33; Ally Financial 2010b, 93). (For
detailed discussions of assistance to GMAC see COP 2010 and Matsumoto and Nygaard
2022.)
Chrysler Financial. In the autumn of 2008, Chrysler’s related finance company, Chrysler
Financial, was also in dire straits, and its legal relationship with Chrysler created significant
mechanical problems for the restructuring of Chrysler, which Treasury helped to resolve.
Given the factors discussed earlier and the need to provide a source of continued financing
for Chrysler dealers and customers, in December 2008, the government provided Chrysler
Financial $1.5 billion in low-interest financing to fund the securitization of new consumer
car loans.39 Although the loans bore a 5-year term, the program lasted only from January
16, 2009, to April 9, 2009, as Chrysler Financial paid off the loans early through
participation in the TALF.
Chrysler entered bankruptcy shortly after the completion of the $1.5 billion facility, and
most of Chrysler Financial’s business was expected to be taken over by GMAC. Chrysler
Financial would be replaced as Chrysler’s auto finance partner contingent on Treasury’s
providing a capital injection to GMAC, various regulatory approvals, and Chrysler’s meeting
several milestones in the bankruptcy court by a specified date (Treasury 2009d; COP 2010,
27, 49; Keegan 2009, 4; Chrysler LLC 2009, 6). Chrysler Financial did continue to do
business, albeit at a much smaller scale. In early 2010, Treasury exited from its interests in
Chrysler Financial (COP 2011, 117–118). (For a detailed discussion of assistance for
Chrysler Financial see Nye 2022c.)
Assistance to Auto Parts Suppliers
Because of concerns about the auto manufacturers’ ability to pay their bills, parts suppliers
were experiencing difficulty borrowing from banks using their receivables as collateral. To
address this concern, on March 19, 2009, the Treasury announced the Auto Supplier
Support Program (ASSP) as an auxiliary program to the AIFP (Treasury 2009a). The ASSP
established two bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicles (SPVs), one for GM and one
for Chrysler, to purchase eligible receivables from participating suppliers at a modest
discount, with the suppliers being chosen to participate by the manufacturers40 (SIGTARP
This is an example of how in a crisis, officials reach to use any variety of available tools to solve a problem,
often utilizing more than one type. Also see Footnote 14.
39 Note that this secured loan to Chrysler Financial contrasts with the unsecured equity support to GMAC. We
have not been able to determine why this difference was made.
40 The use of the SPVs was a creative structuring that facilitated the separation of the funds and control of the
choice of suppliers aided by the manufacturers. However, this later factor was one notable criticism of the
ASSP— was that the government permitted the manufacturers to choose which suppliers participated. This
38
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2009a, 89, 91). The SPVs were funded through a cash contribution from the auto
manufacturer equal to 5% of the amount allocated to them under the ASSP, with the
balance of the program being funded by a TARP loan from Treasury (SIGTARP 2009a, 89).
The government committed up to $5 billion to the ASSP as shown in Figure 7, but only part
of this was allocated to GM and Chrysler, the two participating manufacturers.
Figure 7: Funding of SPVs for the Auto Supplier Support Program

Created by YPFS. Source: SIGTARP 2010, 278.

The program outcomes were considered mixed, and its specific role in reducing the
pressure on US auto parts suppliers is difficult to determine. Among other issues, there was
some dissension on the manufacturers’ getting to choose which suppliers were helped and
also on the terms of the financing. The ASSP was terminated in April 2010, after all loans
made under the program were repaid (SIGTARP 2010, 151). The Treasury collected $115.9
million in interest and fees from the ASSP (SIGTARP 2010, 151).
Auto Warranty Commitment Program
On March 30, 2009, President Obama also announced government-funded protection for
consumer warranties on GM and Chrysler vehicles purchased while they underwent
restructuring (Treasury 2009b; Obama 2009b). The new Auto Warranty Commitment
Program (AWCP) was intended to “give consumers who [were] considering new car
purchases the confidence that even in this difficult economic period, their warrantees
[would] be honored” (Treasury 2009b, 1). Although the AWCP was announced in direct
support of GM and Chrysler, participation was open to all domestic automakers (Treasury
2009b, 2). GM and Chrysler, however, were the only two manufacturers who chose to
participate (Treasury 2009b, 1).

was perceived by some as too narrow a focus, but it was consistent with the government’s intent to maintain
a narrow perimeter on the rescue focused on stabilizing the two manufacturers. This decision also likely
helped avoid much political lobbying on behalf of various suppliers.
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While sometimes referred to as a “government guarantee,” technically, under the AWCP,
the government did not provide a guarantee. Under the AWCP, GM and Chrysler each
established a special purpose vehicle to hold the program funds, which were to equal 125%
of the expected cost of paying warranty claims on each covered vehicle they sold. Each
manufacturer contributed 15% of the expected costs to the SPV in cash and funded the
remaining 110% with a Treasury loan41 (GAO 2009b, 14; Treasury 2009b, 1–2).
Figure 8: Auto Warranty Commitment Program Funding ($ millions)
Company

Company
Contribution

Treasury Loan

GM

63.6

360.6

Chrysler

49.4

280.1

$113.0

$640.7

Total
Source: Authors’ calculations.

The Treasury loans carried an interest rate of the greater of 550 basis points (bps) or
LIBOR plus 350 bps. GM and Chrysler each issued to Treasury additional promissory notes
for 6.67% of the value of any advances drawn upon under the AWCP. The loans were also
secured by a commensurate stake in GM and Chrysler’s warranty SPVs42 and by “Guaranty
Collateral” that included a security interest in all of the collateral owned by the relevant
warranty SPV (Henken 2022, 8). The SPV was to be administered not by the manufacturer
but by a third party with funding from the TARP program (Treasury n.d. 3).
In the event a manufacturer went out of business or otherwise became unable to meet its
warranty obligations, the SPV would appoint (with Treasury’s approval) one or more thirdparty program administrators to assume the manufacturer’s warranty liabilities and to be
paid through the funding held by the SPV (GAO 2009, PDF 19; Treasury n.d.3, 2).
The AWCP was established when sales were at their absolute worst. Sales picked up some
while the companies were in bankruptcy but did not really start recovering until the
bankruptcies were completed. On July 10, 2009, both companies had emerged from
bankruptcy, and although other obligations to the government remained outstanding, GM
and Chrysler paid back all AWCP loan principal, while Chrysler also paid $5.5 million in
interest (Treasury 2009b). The program subsequently closed without either company
having called upon the warranty support (SIGTARP 2009b, 91). It is not clear why GM’s

Structuring the AWCP using SPVs and a loan to the manufacturer permitted the government to “support”
the warranties of new vehicles without absorbing an unknown and or unlimited risk. It also allowed the
government’s loans to be supported by the new companies and secured by their assets.
42 While Treasury funding to GM and Chrysler for the AWCP was structured as a loan, the funding was used to
“capitalize” their SPVs, and so in return Treasury received a commensurate stake in each SPV (Henken 2022,
8).
41

331

The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module Z

Wiggins et al.

interest obligations from the warranty loan were not paid (TARP Transaction Reports). See
Henken 2022 for discussion of the warranty programs.
The Canadian government also established a warranty-support program similar to the US
Auto Warranty Commitment Program “to increase consumer confidence and encourage
Canadians to buy new cars” (Canada 2009). The program applied to vehicles purchased
while GM and Chrysler restructured. Data on the separate amounts targeted for this
program are not available (Henken 2022, 13–14). (See discussion of the AWCP in “Program
Description: Assistance to Related Segments of the Auto Industry” and in Henken 2022 for
more details of the AWCP.)
Outcomes
The Section 363 Bankruptcies
Despite the large size and complex nature of the GM and Chrysler Section 363 bankruptcy
proceedings, they were successfully completed in record timeframes with the new
companies exiting the process and continuing to operate even while the legacy companies
liquidated their remaining assets pursuant to Chapter 11 proceedings (Bosco and Plante
2013, 187).
The use of the expedited process was challenged and criticized by a number of creditors
and legal scholars. Their arguments included: (1) the pace of the bankruptcy was too fast
(Roe and Skeel 2009, 1-3); (2) the bidding procedures were too narrow to include a
genuine bid from anyone besides the government (Roe and Skeel 2009, 16–18); (3) Section
363 was not meant to compromise tort claims, such as product liability and warranty
claims, which were not absorbed by the new companies (Bosco and Plante 2013, 186–188;
Roe and Skeel 2009, 2); (4) the UAW was unduly favored over other unions and creditors
(Bosco and Plante 2013, 186–88); and (5) the US government’s secured debt (and that of
the governments of Canada and Ontario) should have been recharacterized as equity,
giving it a lower priority (Gerber 2009, 47).43
It should be noted, that the arguments all failed in several court cases (or were considered
moot and not decided), and that challenges to the GM bankruptcy had the benefit of the
favorable Chrysler decisions as precedent,44 a fortunate outcome of the government’s

For contrast, see Lubben 2009 for a discussion of why, despite the arguments against them, the Chrysler
and GM bankruptcies “are entirely within the mainstream of chapter 11 practice” (102–103).
44 Judge Gerber remarked in the GM case: “Here this Court has the benefit of the decisions of Bankruptcy
Judge Gonzalez in the Chrysler chapter 11 cases—affirmed by the Second Circuit, for substantially the reasons
Judge Gonzalez set forth in his opinion—on facts extraordinarily similar to those here" (Gerber 2009, 28). See
Gonzalez 2009a (Plaintiff had no standing to challenge the use of TARP funds) and Gonzalez 2009b (Opinion
approving the Chrysler Section 363 sale). The opinions were affirmed by the 2nd Circuit in (Indiana State
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC 2009b) (affirmed for substantially the reasons stated in the opinions in
the lower court) and the Supreme Court refused to hear a related appeal challenging the bankruptcy (Klier
43
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strategy to have the smaller Chrysler go through the process first.45 (See Gerber 2009, 22–
24, for the court’s ruling and reasoning in favor of the “need for speed” with respect to the
GM bankruptcy.)
The Government’s Resolution
The overarching goal of the government’s intervention was to sustain GM and Chrysler so
that the companies could restructure in a way that positioned them to return to
profitability. This goal was achieved with respect to both companies.
General Motors. New GM produced a profit in 2010, the year following its restructuring (GM
2009a; Hirsch 2011) and for most of the following decade (Macrotrends LLC. n.d.). The
New GM initial public offering (IPO), one of the largest in US history, in which the
government sold its first significant stake in the company, was completed above the initial
target price and the government was able to sell more shares than it had initially
anticipated. However, in aggregate, the government recovered only $39.7 billion with
respect to its assistance to GM that began in December 2008 and wound down in December
of 2013 (Treasury 2013a; Treasury 2013b; Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 42).
Figure 9: US AIPF Funding Level ($ billions)
Component
Bridge Loans
Working Capital Loans
DIP Loans
Assistance related to GMAC/Ally Financial
Assistance to Chrysler Financial
Supplier Support Program
Warranty Commitment Program c

GM
13.4
6.4 a
30.1
17.2
–
0.3
0.4

Chrysler
4.0_
4.6 b
3.8c
–_
1.5_
0.1_
0.3_
Total

Total
17.4
11.0
33.9
17.2
1.5
0.4
0.7
$82.1

(a) Includes an additional $361 million loan that GM repaid.
(b) Includes working capital loan to New Chrysler.
(c) The government committed up t $3.8 billion, of which New Chrysler drew $1.9 billion .
Sources: Treasury 2009e; Treasury 2013b; COP 2011, 51.

and Rubenstein 2012, 40–41; Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC 2009a) (temporary stay
vacated and further stay denied).
45 Given the relative sizes of the two companies, the government’s Auto Team determined to have Chrysler go
through the Section 363 bankruptcy process first as a test case to permit any troublesome areas to be
identified and possibly corrected or attended to before the larger GM proceeded. Because the Chrysler
procedure was successful, the result was also favorable precedential case law that supported the GM sale.
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Chrysler. Chrysler returned to profitability in 2010, and repaid its government loans by
mid-2011, several years ahead of schedule. (COP 2011, 20; Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 48).
The company rebounded better than expected, rolling out new products and gaining
market share. (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 48). However, including interest received, the
US government experienced a $1.3 billion loss on its assistance to Chrysler (Klier and
Rubenstein 2012, 41–42).
GMAC. Between December 2008 and December 2009, the US Treasury invested more than
$17.2 billion in capital in GMAC (Treasury 2014). The final sale of Treasury’s equity in
GMAC was completed on December 19, 2014 (Treasury 2014). The total return on the
series of investments was $19.6 billion, a taxpayer profit of $2.4 billion, including dividends
the Treasury received on the preferred shares between 2009 and 2014 (Treasury 2014).
Impacts of the Restructurings
Both GM and Chrysler emerged from their restructurings with much reduced debt,
unburdened by significant legacy liabilities, and more efficient streamlined businesses and
operating structures. (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 42–43, 48, 50). Among the principal
drivers of the return to profits for both companies was the reduction in fixed costs, driven
by reductions in hourly labor costs, total number of employees, number of manufacturing
plants, health insurance costs, expensive liabilities, and the overall break-even number of
vehicle sales (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 42–48). For example, GM had a much lower
break-even point, it had to sell only 19 percent market share or 2.09 million cars to break
even, down from a 25 percent share and 3.88 million cars in 2007 (Klier and Rubenstein
2012, 43; COP 2011, 32).
Overall, not only were the restructurings judged to be positive in the short term, but they
were also thought to have laid foundational changes that could continue to benefit the
companies in the long term. Klier and Rubenstein found that although the restructurings
resulted in plant closings and significant employment reductions in the industry—down 34
percent in vehicle assembly and 32 percent in parts production between 2007 and 2009—
such changes improved the industry’s capacity utilization. “Since capacity utilization is a
key driver of profitability for carmakers, the unprecedented number of assembly plant
closures during the recent restructuring [enabled] carmakers [including GM and Chrysler]
to achieve profitability at historically low output levels” (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 45).
Another development Klier and Rubenstein cited was the Detroit Three’s gain in market
share in 2011, marking a first since 1995. Chrysler and GM increased their market share
from 9.3 percent in 2010 to 10.7 percent in 2011 and from 19.1 percent to 19.7 percent,
respectively, and notably, they gained momentum in the passenger car sector “after three
decades of having ceded most of the high-volume family car market to the Japanese
carmaker” (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 47).
One other major change post-restructuring was that in 2011 labor negotiations resulted in
the Detroit Three and the UAW’s agreement on new variable pay structures that made
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“Detroit’s labor costs [. . .] competitive with foreign producers operating within North
America” (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 48).
Although the government did not recover the full amount of what it invested, there is
consensus that the restructurings were an overall success and of great benefit to the
country: “It is hard to argue that this decision did not deliver important economic benefits
to the recovery and country. If GM and Chrysler had been allowed to fail, in all likelihood
the Great Recession would have been deeper and longer, and the recovery that began in
mid-2009 would have been weaker” (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 4). By contrast, aided by
a greater than expected rebound in consumer demand for vehicles, the restructurings
exceeded expectations, especially with respect to Chrysler, which was at first considered to
be less important (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 4).
Additionally, beyond the individual companies, the auto industry in total contributed
significantly during the recovery, “punching above its weight” (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015,
20). Five years into the recovery, the auto industry accounted for more than 25 percent of
the increase in manufacturing even though the industry comprised only about 6 percent of
total manufacturing production. And since bottoming at 623,300 jobs at the trough of the
recession in June 2009, employment in the motor vehicles and parts manufacturing
industry had increased by 256,000 jobs (as of July 2014), fully 60 percent of all new
manufacturing jobs. Vehicle and parts dealers added an additional 225,000 jobs (Goolsbee
and Krueger 2015, 20). Together the industry added a full 6 percent of all new jobs added
during the first five years of recovery, three times its 2 percent share of total employment
and far from the 1 million jobs predicted to be lost if GM and Chrysler had failed (Goolsbee
and Krueger 2015, 8).
Canadian Outcomes. Chrysler Canada repaid its C$1.6 billion loan to the Canadian and
Ontario governments in May 2011 (OAGC 2014, 12). Old Chrysler’s DIP loan of C$1.28
billion made in support of its bankruptcy was reduced to approximately C$1.2 billion in
2011 following the sale of Chrysler shares held by the government to Fiat, but as of 2014
had not been repaid (OAGC 2014, 13). The most-recent public valuation of outstanding
commercial loans to the auto sector that remained in arrears showed a total of C$1.15
billion still owed to the federal government as of March 2017 (Beeby 2018). In 2018, the
government reported that it had written off a loan of this size, but officials did not confirm
the loans were to Chrysler (Beeby 2018).
The two Canadian subsidiaries did not go through bankruptcy; they remained subsidiaries
of the New GM and New Chrysler. However, overall, the automobile industry in Canada was
negatively affected by the general effects of the financial crisis and the specific impacts of
the restructurings of the GM and Chrysler US parent companies. The industry accounted for
approximately 1.5 percent of the Canadian gross domestic product in 2007 compared with
about 1.1 percent in 2013 (OAGC 2014, 4). In 2007, car manufacturers and parts suppliers
employed 152,000 people, compared to employment of 117,000 people in 2013 (OAGC
2014, 4). As of May 2014, the Automotive Innovation Fund had committed to a maximum of
C$310 million for six approved projects, of which C$131 million had been paid. (OAGC
2014, 7).
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Key Design Decisions

1. What factors influenced the government’s determination that the auto industry
posed a systemic risk to the financial system?
Government efforts to assist the auto industry were not predicated on a potential systemic
risk to the financial system, but rather on consideration of broader risk to the economy and
stimulus efforts. Government opinion on whether to provide assistance to avoid the failure
of GM and Chrysler was mixed. In writing about the government intervention in the auto
industry, members of the Bush and Obama administrations Brian Deese, Steven Shafran,
and Dan Jester point out that: “This was different from the rescues of financial institutions
like American International Group (AIG), which posed an immediate systemic risk to
markets and the economy. Instead, this rescue was, in effect, an extension of our broader
effort to blunt the worst effects of an economy in freefall and provide stimulus to accelerate
an economic recovery” (Deese, Shafran, and Jester 2020, 359–360).
Ron Bloom, a Treasury Department official and adviser to the Task Force, also cited the
rare circumstance in which events occurred:
If a company of General Motors’ or Chrysler’s size and scale had failed in a healthy
economy, they would have been able to be reorganized . . . Companies fail all the time.
The dilemma we faced with GM and Chrysler is the financial system itself had basically
frozen. There was no credit available . . . If the government had not been prepared to
provide them with debtor-in-possession financing . . . there’s no doubt in my mind they
would have liquidated . . . These companies sit at the top of the manufacturing industry
pyramid. There are literally millions of jobs that are directly or indirectly tied to
General Motors and to Chrysler. The argument for saving these auto manufacturers is
essentially not about saving them; it's about saving the industry (Bloom 2022).
Factors the government cited in defense of the decision to provide support focused on the
likely impacts of the companies’ failures on an already weakened economy:
•

the risk of 1.1 million workers losing their jobs, including workers from auto
suppliers and dealers,

•

estimates of a 1 percent reduction in real GDP growth,

•

crippling effects on the auto suppliers and dealers,

•

destabilizing impacts on the communities dependent on the plants and
workers, and

•

the possibility that the government would have to absorb the pension
obligations of tens of thousands of dislocated workers (Deese, Shafran, and
Jester 2020, 361; White House 2008).
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However, it should also be noted that the politically charged climate surrounding the
government’s rescue efforts for the financial sector, which would later develop into a “Wall
Street vs. Main Street” dichotomy, had begun to appear in early 2009 and might have also
influenced the Obama administration’s decision to support manufacturing jobs.
2. What was the government’s purpose for intervening?
The government’s initial purpose for intervening was to provide just enough support to GM
and Chrysler to forestall their failure and buy time for the companies and the government
to decide on a solution that would, it was hoped, put the companies on the path to longterm viability. As stated by Secretary Paulson at the time of announcing the Bridge Loans in
December 2008:
Today we have acted to support Chrysler and General Motors, with the requirement
that they move quickly to develop and adopt acceptable plans for long-term viability.
This step will prevent significant disruption to our economy, while putting the
companies on a path to the significant restructuring necessary to achieve long term
viability. At the same time, we are including loan provisions to protect the taxpayers to
the maximum extent possible (White House 2008).
The decision was heavily influenced by the fact the failure of the manufacturers was
occurring not only in the midst of a burgeoning financial crisis but also amid a presidential
transition (Deese, Shafran, and Jester 2020, 361). The Bush administration (which
originally looked to Congress to provide assistance; Congress did not) wanted to maintain
the companies through the transition so that the Obama administration could determine
the long-term plan.
Once in office, the Obama administration chose to continue to support the companies to
avoid their disorderly bankruptcies and to assist them in developing as quickly as possible
workable restructuring plans that would put them on the road to long-term viability
(Deese, Shafran, and Jester 2020, 372–374; Treasury 2013a).
Both administrations sought to minimize the duration of hands-on government support to
avoid potential political pressures to intervene more intrusively in the management of
these companies—for example, by compelling the companies to produce more fuel-efficient
cars or influencing decisions regarding which plants to close (Deese, Shafran, and Jester
2020, 360).
3.

What legal authority supported the government’s intervention?

No funding was specifically passed to support the auto industry. The AIFP—including the
funding to the manufacturers, for the auto suppliers, for the auto finance companies, and
for the warranty programs—was funded out of the TARP (COP 2009b, 201–203). At the
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time of the company’ s initial requests for assistance in October 2008, the TARP had just
been enacted, but the Bush administration was not inclined to assist the auto companies
using TARP funds. There were credible arguments that the law had been passed with
assistance to the financial industry in mind46 and uncertainty as to whether assistance to
the manufacturers fell under the purview of the law (COP 2009b, 72–74). At one point,
President Bush and Secretary Paulson both were of the opinion that it did not (COP 2009b,
115; see also discussion at COP 2009b, 72–74).
However, after Congress declined to provide targeted funds, the President and Secretary
Paulson consulted Treasury counsel and revisited the possibility of using TARP. In
announcing the AIFP, Secretary Paulson stated:
Treasury will make these loans using authority provided for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program [TARP]. While the purpose of this program and the enabling legislation is to
stabilize our financial sector, the authority allows us to take this action. Absent
congressional action, no other authorities existed to stave off a disorderly bankruptcy
of one or more auto companies (Paulson 2008a).
In broad terms, TARP authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase “troubled
assets” from “financial institutions.” The statutory definitions are descriptive rather than
restrictive.47 For example, although the definition of “financial institutions” does not
mention manufacturers, it does encompass “any institution, including, but not limited to any
bank, savings association, credit union, security broker or dealer, or insurance company,
established and regulated under the laws of the United States or any State [emphasis
added].”48 “Troubled assets” are defined as certain mortgages and mortgage-related
For example, all the descriptive entities included in the operative definition are financial organizations.
“Whether Treasury had the legal authority to use TARP funds to bail out Chrysler and GM is the subject of
considerable debate. There was, however, enough ambiguity in the TARP legislation, and there continues to
be ambiguity about congressional intent, so that Treasury has faced no effective challenge to its decision to
use TARP funds for this purpose” (COP 2009b, 5). Also see COP 2009b, pages 78–79 for a discussion of
Congressional intent.
47 Given the uncertain nature of financial crises, drafting legislation or regulatory amendments broadly as was
done with TARP through its descriptive rather than restrictive definitions and inclusion of a clear mechanism
for bringing other securities within its purview has the benefit of providing tools for addressing
unanticipated developments. Several of the government officials we interviewed expressed the opinion that
without TARP, there would have been no way to rescue the auto industry. Steven Rattner, who was head of
the President Obama’s Auto Taskforce saw it this way: “We had, under the Bush administration, TARP money,
intended mostly for the banks, but it was available to us, and that allowed us to put money in these companies
without going through Congress, and that was an important piece . . . It’s a disaster . . . if you have to go to
Congress . . . Once you bring Congress into the equation, it makes it a lot more complicated. There’s no
question about it” (Rattner 2022, 4).
48 The relevant TARP definition of ‘‘financial institution’’ is “any institution, including, but not limited to, any
bank, savings association, credit union, security broker or dealer, or insurance company, established and
regulated under the laws of the United States or any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Guam,
American Samoa, or the United States Virgin Islands, and having significant operations in the United States,
46
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securities and “any other financial instrument [emphasis added]” that the Secretary of the
Treasury determines, in accordance with procedures set out in the statute, “the purchase of
which is necessary to promote financial market stability.”49
TARP also contained a clear mechanism by which the Secretary could make determinations
that unenumerated financial instruments were within its purview. Secretary Paulson
utilized this mechanism when he, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
as required, determined that TARP could be used for the auto industry. In so doing, the
Secretary determined that (1) the auto companies engaged in manufacturing vehicles and
providing credit in connection with such vehicles were “financial institutions under Section
3(5) of the law,”50 and (2) that the obligations of such companies were necessary to
promote stability to the financial system and as such were “troubled assets” under 12 USC
5202, Section 3(9)(b). The determination reads in part:
WHEREAS, certain thrift and other holding companies which are engaged in the
manufacturing of automotive vehicles and the provision of credit and financing in
connection with the manufacturing and purchase of such vehicles have applied under
the TARP Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program (the “SSFI”) requesting
that the Department of the Treasury purchase obligations of such companies
consistent with the SSFI;
WHEREAS, such thrift and other holding companies engaged in the manufacturing of
automotive vehicles and the provision of credit and financing in connection with the
manufacturing and purchase of such vehicles are “Financial Institutions” for purposes
of section 3(5) of the Act as they are “institution[s] established and regulated under the
laws of the United States and have significant operations in the United States; and
WHEREAS, as Secretary, I have consulted with the Chairman, and we have jointly
concluded that the TARP’s purchase of the obligations is necessary to promote stability
to the financial system of the United States.
NOW, THEREFORE, I HEREBY DETERMINE that the obligations of such financial
but excluding any central bank of, or institution owned by, a foreign government” (12 USC 5202, Section
3[5]).
49 TARP defines “troubled assets” as “(A) residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations,
or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each case was originated or
issued on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase of which the Secretary determines promotes financial
market stability; and (B) any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which is
necessary to promote financial market stability, but only upon transmittal of such determination, in writing,
to the appropriate committees of Congress” (12 USC 5202 Section 3[9]).
50 In connection with Chrysler’s bankruptcy case certain of the company’s secured debtholders argued that an
auto manufacturer could not be a “financial institution.” They were found by Judge Gonzalez to “lack standing
to assert any arguments about the authority for the Government’s loans, because they had no injury in fact
traceable to the source of the funding” (GMC 2009c, 11-12; also see Gonzalez 2009a).
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institutions are financial instruments the purchase of which is necessary to promote
stability to the financial system of the United States, and, as such, are “troubled assets,”
as that term is defined in Section 3(9)(b) of the Act, and eligible to be purchased under
the TARP (Paulson 2008b).
The determination was transmitted to the “appropriate committees of Congress” as
required by the Act (see Dassin 2009, 17–32).
On April 29, 2009, after the Obama administration had taken office, then-Secretary
Geithner also issued a determination that was substantially similar to the Paulson
determination, except it referenced the AIFP and seemed to shift away slightly from the
nexus with the auto financing companies:
WHEREAS, certain companies engaged in the manufacturing of automotive vehicles
have applied under the TARP AIFP requesting that the Department of the Treasury
purchase debt obligations or equity of such holding companies and other companies
consistent with the AIFP;
WHEREAS, such holding companies and other companies are “financial institutions”
for purposes of section 3(5) of the Act as they are “institutions” established and
regulated under the laws of the United States and have significant operations in the
United States; and
NOW, THEREFORE, I HEREBY DETERMINE that the debt obligations or equity of such
financial institutions are financial instruments the purchase of which is necessary to
promote financial market stability, and as such, are “troubled assets,” as that term is
defined in section 3(9)(B) of the Act, and eligible to be purchased under the TARP
(Geithner 2009a).
The Secretaries’ determinations were scrutinized administratively and in court. In several
cases involving the assistance to Chrysler and GM, the judge determined that the objectors
did not have standing to raise the issue or that the issue was moot (COP 2009b, 76; Gerber
2009, 83-85). The rationale and determination of the ability to use TARP funds applies
equally to the financing provided to the new Chrysler (COP 2009a, 131).
4. What tools did the government have available?
Following the companies’ initial requests to Congress for assistance in October 2008,
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd sent a letter to the Federal Reserve
requesting support to the industry. Although the Fed had already used its emergency
lending authority under Federal Reserve Act Section 13(3) to assist a number of financial
institutions (Bear Stearns, Fannie and Freddie Mac, and AIG), Chairman Ben Bernanke
wrote a response explaining that the Fed could not have lent to the companies under its
Section 13(3) authority because they did not have adequate collateral.
Initially, though the TARP had recently passed, it was unclear that its funds could be used
to assist the manufacturers. However, the Bush administration determined that TARP
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funds could be used to support the auto industry by purchasing “troubled assets” from the
manufacturers, including debt securities of GM and Chrysler’s holding company, making
loans and injecting capital. TARP funding was used to fund the loans to GM and Chrysler
and their related post-bankruptcy companies, the loans and equity purchases in Chrysler
Financial and GMAC, the Auto Supplier Support Program, and the Auto Warranty
Commitment Program.
Procedures under the Bankruptcy Code were also available. The code provides a
framework for protecting, valuing, and equitably distributing assets among all creditors
according to an established priority. Equity owners are last in order of recovery and often
do not receive any compensation for their holdings. Because of its automatic stay, barring
almost all transfers of assets for a period leading up to the bankruptcy filing and during,
subject to court approval, a bankruptcy avoids a grab for assets (similar to a run) that can
lead to inequities among stakeholders.
Procedures under the Bankruptcy Code, notably Chapter 7 (liquidation) and Chapter 11
(reorganization) were available to GM and Chrysler. However, despite their worsening
conditions, neither company had begun to make plans for such a process. The Obama
Treasury team believed it would be difficult to acquire DIP financing in the required
amounts from the market at the time. Therefore, the government recommended that both
companies pursue reorganization through an expedited Section 363 sale process, with the
legacy companies liquidating under Chapter 7. The government funding to support the
proceedings was protected as DIP funding, which is given a super priority status under the
code.
Although the Federal Reserve declined to provide customized funding to GM and Chrysler,
the auto manufacturers and their finance arms did access financial support under a number
of the broad-based liquidity programs put in place by the Fed, such as the TALF (COP
2009b, 195) Additionally, the Fed’s Board of Governors also approved GMAC’s application
to convert to a bank holding company on an expedited basis, which granted access to the
Fed’s discount window and allowed the company to receive funds under a TARP program
intended for banks, while also subjecting it to heightened supervision (Federal Reserve
2008).
5. What additional tools did the government seek to acquire?
The Bush administration originally sought to have Congress pass legislation providing
targeted assistance to the auto industry. However, several attempts failed at different
stages, and as a result President Bush determined to use TARP funds for the industry.
6. What was the government’s initial strategy?
The Bush administration’s initial strategy was to provide conditional limited support to GM
and Chrysler to forestall their failure until the Obama administration was sworn in and the
new administration could determine what, if any, continued support it would provide. In
granting the Bridge Loans, the Bush administration borrowed a condition-based
framework that had been included in a bill that the House had passed, but that had died.
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The administration required the manufacturers to produce and submit viability plans
outlining how they would achieve long-term stability (COP 2009b, 9–10; Klier and
Rubenstein 2012, 38). The Obama administration adopted this condition-based funding
strategy. The incoming administration’s immediate priority was to determine as quickly as
possible whether to continue to fund the companies’ plans for long-term viability or to
withdraw assistance (COP 2009b, 10; Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 38.)
7. How did the government implement its initial strategy?
On December 19, 2008, the Treasury department announced that it would provide
collateralized Bridge Loans to GM and Chrysler. The loans were short term (60 days) and
required each company to, among other terms, submit a viability plan detailing how it
planned to reach long-term viability, on what time frame, and identifying needed funding.
Additional funds were conditioned on the acceptability of the plans. If deemed
unsatisfactory, outstanding commitments could be rescinded and the Bridge Loans could
be called. 51 Details of the requirements of the viability plans, including that the companies
seek concessions from their creditors, debtholders, and employee unions, were made
public. See Nye 2022a for more detail regarding the terms of the Bridge Loans.
8. How did the government decide on the specific terms of its initial interventions?
Notably, assistance to the manufacturers was characterized by providing limited funds on a
short-term basis with additional support conditioned on regular “check-ins” via the
viability plans. This was characteristically different from the government’s approach to the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Although the GSEs were taken into
government-managed conservatorships, Treasury also made a blanket commitment to
maintain their positive net worth.52 The Federal Reserve bridge loan to AIG not only
seemed to anticipate no additional assistance, but it also could not be called on the basis of
the steps AIG took to fix itself.53 The approach with the auto manufacturers seems to reflect
reluctance and uncertainty around the support, as well as a desire for heightened
transparency.
The original amounts of the auto Bridge Loans and the DIP financing were based on
amounts requested by GM and Chrysler, respectively, and what the government
determined was needed to sustain the companies. The timing of the distribution of the
Bridge Loan funds (one lump sum for Chrysler and three distributions for GM) seem to
have been individually negotiated with the companies. Some funds committed to GM were
Conditioning additional funding on the acceptability of viability plans was unusual, not only because it was
indicative of the Bush administration’s desire to not hamstring the incoming Obama administration with a
completed decision, but also because it contrasted sharply with the terms of assistance provided to financial
institutions. It does, however, demonstrate that such terms can be required in ad hoc support cases and may
result in significant long-term impacts. Also see footnote 30.
52 See Zanger-Tishler and Wiggins (2021) for a discussion of the government’s assistance to the GSEs.
53 See Wiggins, Lawson, et al. (2021) for a detailed discussion of the government’s assistance to AIG.
51
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delayed pending receipt of a satisfactory viability plan and conditioned on the release of
the second half of the TARP funds.
9. Did the government’s strategy change over time?
While it can be debated whether the ultimate bankruptcies of GM and Chrysler should be
considered a change of strategy, we believe that the most accurate characterization may be
that they instead constitute an implementation of the Bush and Obama administrations’
original strategy to support the companies until a long-term solution for their viability
could be determined, or not. However, we do characterize two developments as changes to
the government’s strategy (1) utilization of the Section 363 expedited bankruptcy
procedure, and (2) providing assistance to related industry entities.
10. How did the government implement its amended strategy?
To maximize the chance of success of the GM and Chrysler restructurings, and avoid
contamination of healthier manufacturers, the government instituted two amendments to
its original strategy. The first was to use the expedited Section 363 bankruptcy procedure
to restructure the companies quicker than a traditional Chapter 11 procedure could have.
In this regard it should also be noted that, originally, any mention of bankruptcy was seen
as an anathema because it was thought that customers would abandon the companies.
Second, the government also implemented three tangential programs of assistance. It
provided loans and other support to GMAC54 and Chrysler Financial55 to maintain the
critical financing for the manufacturers’ dealer networks and retail purchases (Goolsbee
and Krueger 2015, 7–8). It created the ASSP56 to provide financial support to auto suppliers
selected by the two manufacturers (COP 2009b, 22–23). Last, it provided warranty support
to new customers who purchased vehicles from the two manufacturers57 (COP 2009b, 21–
22).
11. How did the government determine the specifics of its amended interventions?
The government decided to have the GM and Chrysler pursue bankruptcy under Section
363 rather than a more standard Chapter 11 process because it would enable the
companies to discharge many of their liabilities and emerge from bankruptcy as viable
companies with new balance sheets and plans. Sadiq Malik, a member of the President’s
Auto Task Force, commented that the Task Force thought the Section 363 process was the
best way to restructure the business and the quickest way to do it considering the position
the companies were in:

For a detailed discussion of assistance to GMAC/Ally Financial, see Matsumoto and Nygaard (2022).
For a detailed discussion of assistance to Chrysler Financial, see Nye (2022c).
56 For a detailed discussion of the ASSP, see Matsumoto (2022).
57 For a detailed discussion of the AWSP, see Henken (2022).
54
55
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Given the type of issues that GM and Chrysler faced—these are very old companies that
have been around forever. Over the years, they had all sorts of liabilities. They have a
massive balance sheet, lots of leverage, lots of liabilities related to pensions, labor. [. . . ]
We worked with the management team and tried different ways of running their
numbers, but their cashflow profile, their financial profile was such that their liquidity
needs were massive. There was so much in liabilities that if you just gave money, you
could not be sure if—or how—you would get your money back. Going through the
bankruptcy allowed you to create more value and more ability to make your money
back (Malik 2022, 5–7).
A major second consideration was that Section 363 provides an expedited process that can
be completed in a much shorter time frame than a traditional process.58 Given the weak
nature of the economy, the already significant layoffs and plant closings, and the risk of
damage to related segments of the industry, a process that reached a conclusion in a
fraction of the time of a traditional Chapter 11 restructuring was highly valued, although
contentious (COP 2009b, 46–48). There was also concern that the longer process would put
the restructuring at risk as consumers would avoid the companies.
The DIP funds were released in connection with each company’s entering into a Section
363 bankruptcy procedure. Consistent with standard DIP financing, the interest rate on the
loans was a penalty rate and the government’s claims were granted super priority status.
The loan terms were approved by the court. The government also provided funds to the
new companies as working capital.
Another change to the government’s initial strategy arose due to the highly integrated
nature of the auto industry. It became apparent that a failure of either GM or Chrysler could
lead to dysfunctions in other areas of the industry, for examples, suppliers, whose collapse
could put healthier manufactures at risk. Similarly, failure of key suppliers could jeopardize
the restructuring of the two manufacturers. The auto finance companies were also
experiencing the effects of the credit crunch, making financing difficult for dealers and
consumers. And it was recognized that customers would be reluctant to purchase a vehicle
if they felt that the manufacturer would not stand behind the warranty. Thus, the
government determined that these three related structures—auto finance, suppliers, and
customer warranties—needed to be supported as well.

Notably, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy involved a Section 363 sale. On September 20, 2008, Barclays
PLC purchased the majority of assets of Lehman’s North American investment banking and capital markets
business valued at $49.7 billion for $45 billion in what the court described as “the largest, most expedited and
probably the most dramatic asset sale that has ever occurred in bankruptcy history.” The sale was approved
just 5 days after Lehman’s filing (Chadbourne & Parke LLP 2011).
58
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12. How did the government protect the taxpayers?
Treasury protected its interests in the GM and Chrysler Bridge Loans and working capital
loans in a variety of ways:
•

The Bridge Loans were secured by liens on all of GM’s and Chrysler’s
unencumbered assets, although many of their assets were already
encumbered.

•

The Bridge Loans provided the government with warrants to purchase GM
common stock and both GM and Chrysler granted the government Additional
Notes. Although the government did not directly benefit from the warrants
and Additional Notes, they were redeemed in connection with the
restructurings, and it did benefit from the larger theory of the taxpayers’
sharing in the company’s recovery through the conversion of its loan debt into
equity in the surviving companies. (See “Program Description: Assistance to
General Motors” and “Program Description: Assistance to Chrysler” for further
discussion of the warrants and Additional Notes.)

•

The Bridge Loan agreements contained provisions prohibiting the
manufacturers from paying dividends, selling major assets, or conducting outof-the-ordinary transactions while the Bridge Loans were outstanding.

•

The government’s future funding was conditioned on the manufacturers’
producing acceptable viability plans, which required that certain specific
objectives be pursued and met.

•

The Bridge Loans contained provisions converting them to DIP financing if the
manufacturer filed for bankruptcy protection.

Treasury and EDC protected their interests in the GM and Chrysler DIP Loans and loans to
the companies that survived the restructurings, New GM and New Chrysler, in a variety of
ways:
•

The DIP funding was supported by first-priority liens on substantially all of the
companies’ assets. The Bankruptcy Code allowed the loans to bypass more
senior creditors (with a few exceptions).

•

Treasury obtained a first-priority lien on all of the assets of New Chrysler with
respect to its post-bankruptcy funding.

•

Treasury and EDC converted the GM Bridge Loans, working capital loans, and
DIP loans into equity in New GM rather than weigh down the company with
excessive debt. Treasury’s controlling interest created the opportunity for
taxpayers to benefit from appreciation in the stock’s value. It also permitted
Treasury to have input into company management, including influencing the
company’s IPO, which proved to be oversubscribed; Treasury eventually sold
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its shares for a cumulative return of $29.22 billion dollars (COP 2009a, 54).
Despite this result, the government’s ownership of a controlling interest in an
industrial company, and timing of the sale, raised controversy. 59
•

Treasury and EDC received Additional Notes in connection with their DIP
lending to GM and Chrysler (GMC 2009b, PDF pp. 9, 49). Although ultimately
the notes were not repaid, they were intended as additional security as
required by TARP. (See “Program Description: Assistance to General Motors”
and Program Description: Assistance to Chrysler.”)

•

In return for providing financing to New Chrysler, Treasury received a 9.85%
equity stake in New Chrysler and additional power over the VEBA’s large stake
in New Chrysler. (COP 2011, 56–57). While the receipt of equity anticipated
that the Treasury and taxpayers might benefit from appreciation in New
Chrysler’s stock price post-bankruptcy, such benefit was limited when
compared with the results at GM due to the size of the government’s interest
and the decision to use equity as an incentive for Fiat to succeed at the merger
and availability of funds.

Fiat had rights to purchase Treasury’s shares and otherwise increase its ownership if it
satisfied certain operational milestones. (However, Fiat could only acquire a controlling
interest in New Chrysler after it repaid all TARP and Canadian government loans.) In July
2011, Fiat purchased Treasury’s shares for $500 million and paid an additional $60 million
relating to rights that Treasury held with respect to the VEBA’s equity interests, which it
did not have funding to acquire (Treasury 2011).
13. How did the government administer the rescue?
President Obama formed the Presidential Auto Task Force to oversee the assistance to the
auto industry. The Cabinet-level Task Force, chaired by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner
and economic adviser Larry Summers, was assisted by a team of staff members at the
Treasury and headed by two appointed co-chairs, Ron Bloom and Steve Rattner. The
Treasury Auto Team reviewed the viability plans and reported to the Task Force and also
engaged in negotiations with the auto manufacturers and other interested parties
While owning equity interests created the opportunity for the taxpayers to share in the stock price
appreciation as the company rebounded, participating in the upside of recovery, an objective valued by
Congress and built into TARP, there was no guarantee that such benefits would be realized. Although the
government realized a profit from its ownership of GM, it also faced criticism for controlling a private
company, and its decision to unwind its position “as quickly as possible” came under scrutiny. The situation
highlights the tension between early disposition and retaining ownership longer to maximize returns, as
pointed out in a 2011 Congressional Oversight Panel report: “This sale represents a major recovery of
taxpayer funds, but it is important to note that Treasury received a price of $33.00 per share—well below the
$44.59 needed to be on track to recover fully taxpayers’ money. Selling stock for less than this break-even
price, Treasury essentially ‘locked in’ a loss of billions of dollars and thus greatly reduced the likelihood that
taxpayers will ever be repaid in full” (COP 2011, 1–2).
59
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(employees, unions, creditors, bondholders, and in the case of Chrysler, Fiat) to reach
successful viability plans.
14. How did the government coordinate its actions?
The overwhelming majority of the government actions were conducted by the Auto Team
and reported up to the Task Force, which reported to the President.
Treasury coordinated with the Federal Reserve on the creation of the TALF and financially
supported the program, which, among other things would lend against securitized dealer
and customer auto loans, a market that had largely evaporated at the time.
There was also some coordination between Treasury and the governments of Canada and
Ontario with respect to the DIP loans for GM and Chrysler, as discussed in “Program
Description: Canadian Participation in Assistance to Manufacturers.”
15. How did the government communicate the terms of the intervention?
The government took a more transparent approach to the auto assistance than it did for
any other rescue of a major company during the crisis. Notably, while many of the largest
rescue efforts prior to the autos (for example, AIG, the banking assistance under the Capital
Assistance Program, and Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) were presided over by Fed
Chairman Bernanke and Secretary Paulson, President Bush devoted a special public
address on December 19, 2008, to announcing the assistance to the auto industry and
explaining the reasons behind such assistance and some of its structure to the public; he
didn’t do that for Bear Stearns, the GSEs, or AIG.
While much information was disclosed about several of the other significant rescues (for
example, AIG and the GSEs) after actions were taken, a major difference with the auto
rescue was that the entire game plan was largely laid out to the public as it unfolded
through the process of requiring the viability plans. This course of action may have been
influenced by the timing of the rescue, which occurred largely at the very beginning of the
Obama administration, and by the fact that unlike the other rescues, various auto
manufacturer stakeholders were expected to make significant concessions.
Following significant decisions, both presidential administrations published fact sheets and
timelines of the plans and steps taken (see, for example, Treasury 2009e and Treasury
2013a). Under the Bush administration, communications were issued by the White House,
and later, under the Obama administration, by the President’s Auto Task Force, in both
cases situating the rescue in the White House rather than in the Treasury as other TARP
rescue efforts had been. The administrations published detailed descriptions of the
conditions that attached to the assistance and of evaluations of the required viability plans
made by the Auto Task Force.
The terms of future funding required that specific accommodations be sought from
creditors, employees, and unions and in some instances administration officials
participated directly in negotiations with the auto manufacturers and such parties, a more
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engaged posture than the government assumed with other major rescues (COP 2009b, 85–
91). President Obama also held a number of press conferences to speak about the rescue. In
one such conference (and a related press release), he criticized GM’s creditors for not
“doing their part,” alluding to the manufacturer’s failed effort to get 70% of creditors to
agree to concessions that would have permitted a pre-planned bankruptcy, also an
expedited process.
16. What was the government’s exit strategy?
The government’s initial exit strategy under President Bush was to prevent a disorderly
collapse of the companies until the Obama administration could take over and to condition
additional funding the requirement of an acceptable viability plan. The Obama
administration made clear in communication that it did not want to run the companies but
only to stabilize them, avoid negative effects from their disorderly failure, protect the
taxpayers’ investment, and disengage from them as soon as the opportunity for a successful
IPO presented itself. (To this end, Treasury received nonvoting common shares in New GM
and New Chrysler after their Section 363 bankruptcies. “Treasury is guided by a number of
different principles for its involvement in private companies and, as with GM, it needs to
balance its desire to exit as soon as practicable against its objective of maximizing the value
of the taxpayers’ investment” (COP 2011, 33). In testifying before the COP, Auto Task Force
co-chair Steve Rattner, described the government’s goals as an investor as follows:
•

First, the Government has no desire to own equity in companies any longer
than necessary, and it will seek to dispose of its ownership interest as soon as
practicable.

•

Second, the Government will protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing
its ownership stake in a hands-off commercial manner.

•

And finally, as a common shareholder, the Government will only vote on core
governance issues, including the selection of a company’s board of directors
and major corporate events or transactions (COP 2009a, 15).

On November 18, 2010, 16 months after emerging from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, New GM
launched an IPO and sold shares worth $23.1 billion, making it the largest IPO in US history
at the time. The IPO was widely considered a success, garnering a larger-than-expected
share price and subscriptions. Treasury sold a significant portion of its stake in New GM
and was able to sell even more shares than they had initially anticipated (Klier and
Rubenstein 2012, 42). Through additional sales, the government steadily reduced its
holdings in New GM through December 2013, resulting in a cumulative return of $29.22
billion dollars.
The government began with a much smaller equity interest in New Chrysler (9.85%), and
this investment was quickly diluted by Fiat’s exercise of certain agreements among the
parties. In July 2011, Fiat purchased Treasury equity shares for a predetermined $500
million. Thus, although both deals granted the Treasury equity shares, the grants were very
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different in nature, and the government did not have a significant opportunity to benefit
from Chrysler’s post-bankruptcy recovery, much of the benefit of which went to Fiat, who
was guiding the company and which by 2011 was the controlling shareholder.
17. Were there unique factors that influenced the government’s actions?
(a) The government’s use of TARP funds for the auto industry was controversial.
At the time of the auto manufacturers’ initial requests for funding in October 2008, it was
unclear whether TARP funds could be used to assist the auto industry and the Bush
administration originally declined to provide such assistance. However, after Congress
failed to provide targeted funding for the auto manufacturers, the Bush administration
reconsidered its initial position regarding the availability of TARP funds and in consultation
with Secretary Paulson and counsel decided that such funds could be used to assist the
industry. This decision was controversial from the start and the “subject of considerable
debate” (COP 2009b, 4). The administration even stated publicly that “The President's
preference was not to use TARP funds to assist these firms, but since Congress failed to act,
executive branch action is necessary” (White House 2008).
Mara McNeill, who was Treasury senior counsel in the Obama administration, recalls that
counsel advised Secretary Geithner regarding “some of the risks in terms of people who
could later object that we weren’t within proper authority. [We engaged in] a lot of triage
regarding what we could do with the loans, what an exception would look like, what were
the risks around the new administration making new advances” (McNeill 2022, 2).
The government provided public statements, testimony to Congress, and argued in several
court cases that its interpretation permitting the use of TARP funds was correct. (See COP
2009b, 71–78; Dassin 2009; and discussion at Key Design Decision No. 3.) In some court
cases, the issue was deterred to be moot and left undecided. However, in considering the
issue, the court presiding over the GM bankruptcy agreed, finding that:
The US Treasury’s extension of credit to, and resulting security interest in, [GM], as set
forth in the DIP Facility and the Existing UST Loan Agreement and as authorized in the
interim and final orders approving the DIP Facility, is a valid use of funds pursuant to
EESA (emphasis added).
The rationale and determination of the ability to use TARP funds applies equally to the
financing provided to the new Chrysler (COP 2009a, 131).
Notwithstanding this one court ruling, the COP’s 2009 analysis of this point remarks that,
“There was, however, enough ambiguity in the TARP legislation, and there continues to be
ambiguity about congressional intent, so that Treasury has faced no effective challenge to
its decision to use TARP funds for this purpose” (COP 2009b, 4).
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Two years later, in 2011, the COP commented that, “The use of TARP resources to prevent
the collapse of two of the three domestic automakers was and continues to be
controversial” (COP 2011, 8). Ultimately, however, the Panel concluded that:60
At the end of this analysis, the question that remains is whether the executive should
get the benefit of the doubt about a close question of statutory interpretation when the
executive might have thought in good faith that interpreting the statute in a particular
way [sic] was crucial to the national interest. This question may never be answered
with any finality as the Panel is not aware of any court before which the issue is
currently pending and therefore it may never be resolved (COP 2009b, 79).
Thus, although controversial, the government’s interpretation and use of TARP funds for
the auto industry stood amidst what appears to have been more of a squall of controversy
than a tsunami. This may indicate that in the middle of a crisis, the government’s exercise
of its discretion will be extended the benefit of the doubt even though such exercise may
be, or may appear to be, stretching its authority.
(b) The fact that there were multiple companies seeking funding provided opportunities
for the government to be strategic.
The fact that GM and Chrysler were both seeking funding from the government provided
opportunities for the government to be strategic in its response. It did this through
individualized evaluations of the viability plans, requiring stakeholder concessions, and by
crafting company-specific responses. Publishing the conditions of the funding and the
evaluations of the viability plans added to the government’s credibility and also likely
influenced stakeholders, especially when it suggested that it was willing to let Chrysler fail.
The strategic timing and use of tools, such as the possibility of allowing Chrysler to fail,
reintroducing the idea of bankruptcy, and then having Chrysler go through bankruptcy
before the larger GM, may have improved the overall success of the project.
(c) The government required stricter funding conditions and was more engaged than in
the rescues of financial institutions.
The government took a more strict, engaged, and transparent approach to the auto
assistance than it did for other rescues of major companies during the crisis. It required
that GM and Chrysler seek specific accommodations from creditors, employees, unions, and
bondholders as conditions to funding and in some instances participated directly in
negotiations with a more engaged posture than it had assumed with other major rescues
(Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 38–40). The Congressional Oversight Panel commented in its
2009 report that,

It also cited earlier situations that provide a basis for deferring to the executive’s interpretation (see COP
2009b, 71–78).
60
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Treasury’s financial assistance to the automotive industry differed significantly from
its assistance to the banking industry. Assistance given to the banks has carried less
stringent conditions, and money was made readily available without a review of
business plans or without any demands that shareholders forfeit their stake in the
company or top management forfeit their jobs. By contrast, Treasury was a tough
negotiator as it invested taxpayer funds in the automotive industry. The bulk of the
funds were available only after the companies had filed for bankruptcy, wiping out
their old shareholders, cutting their labor costs, reducing their debt obligations, and
replacing some top management (COP 2009b, 3).
Both President Bush and President Obama personally assumed a highly visible leadership
role in the auto rescue through presidential speeches, including several on the part of
Obama. Obama established the Presidential Auto Task Force, rather than having the
Treasury run the rescue. By contrast, during the previous year, the Bush administration
allowed Fed Chairman Bernanke and Secretary Paulson be the main spokespersons for the
government’s actions combatting the crisis.
Another difference is that government officials directly engaged with the auto
manufacturers and stakeholders (for example, creditors and unions) to negotiate the
concessions they sought. The COP commented in its 2009 report that, “Others wish the
government had been equally tough in negotiating the investment of TARP funds in banks”
(COP 2009b, 111). The panel also acknowledged that there had been rumors about
government officials using aggressive tactics with pre-petition creditors to negotiate
concessions and structure the Section 363 sale. In light thereof, it noted that this posture
raised some concerns from stakeholders, given the government’s overweight position in
any negotiation. 61
The government’s transparency also differed with the auto rescue. It published detailed
descriptions of the preconditions that it attached to the assistance and of its evaluations of
the required viability plans creating a public blow-by-blow record of the process (Klier and
Rubenstein 2012, 38-40).
The government’s course of action with respect to the auto rescue may have been
influenced by (1) the belief that one or more of the companies was insolvent at the time,
whereas the solvency of the financial companies assisted was debatable; (2) the timing of
the rescue, which occurred largely at the very beginning of the Obama administration’s
tenure, providing the new administration an opportunity to “take charge” of a major crisis
issue; (3) the fact that the industry’s problems were perceived more as an economic issue

61 This

type of pushing helped achieve the terms and concessions that the government thought necessary for a
successful restructuring. However, care should be taken in such negotiations. Given the overweight authority
of the government, any pressure to concede may be viewed as coercive pressure, which can lead to claims of
favoritism and which could be publicly embarrassing. See, for example, COP 2009b, 92–102, for a discussion
in “Government Involvement in Bankruptcy Proceedings.”
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than as one of systemic financial instability; and (4) the fact that compared to the
intricacies and complications of financial companies and sophisticated instruments like
collateralized debt obligations, the issues presented by the auto industry were
straightforward, easily understood, and populist in nature.
(d) The size of the manufacturers and the criticality of the auto industry to employment
and the economy were major factors.
After Congress failed to provide targeted funding for the auto manufacturers, the Bush
administration reconsidered its initial position regarding the availability of TARP funds and
decided that such funds could be used to assist the industry. In doing so, the government
stated that this decision was heavily influenced by the size of the manufacturers, their
position within the auto industry, and how significant the effects of a disorderly failure of
either company would be on the already weakened economy, including the possible
significant loss of jobs (White House 2008). Despite these factors, there was credible
discussion of letting Chrysler fail if it could not secure a partner (Goolsbee and Krueger
2015, 2, 11–15).
(e) The interconnectedness and interdependence of the auto industry had to be
addressed.
Because the auto industry is a highly integrated industry, the failure of either GM or
Chrysler risked contaminating the vast network of auto suppliers that supported not only
these two manufacturers but also healthier manufacturers. To avoid this, the government
created the Auto Supplier Assistance Program, which enabled each manufacturer to select
certain key suppliers to participate in government-supported funding.
Issues of interconnection also accounted for the participation of the governments of
Canada and Ontario in funding GM and Chrysler prior to bankruptcy and the subsequent
DIP loans.
(f) The high-cost and long-term nature of vehicles as products required addressing the
financing issues.
Vehicles are high-cost, long-term assets that almost always are financed by the consumer.
In the case of both GM and Chrysler, a significant portion of consumer refinancing was done
through preferential arrangements with GMAC and Chrysler Financial, respectively. These
companies also provided significant portions of the manufacturers’ dealer floor plan
financing, which brought the inventory to the showrooms. The near freeze of credit
markets and ABS securitization in autumn 2008 had significantly crippled these funding
sources, creating a substantial roadblock to the manufacturers’ chances of recovery. Thus,
the government provided funding to GMAC and Chrysler Financial to maintain their ability
to support GM and Chrysler through funding as they rehabilitated (COP 2009b, 75). The
Treasury also worked with the Federal Reserve to enhance the TALF to securitize vehicle
loans and provide funding and additional assistance to the finance companies to restart
these funding channels
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In a similar vein, because of the reluctance of consumers to purchase vehicles if they feel
there is a risk that the manufacturer will not stand behind the product, the government
also provided support for warranties on new vehicles purchased from Chrysler and GM
(COP 2009b, 21–22).

IV.

Evaluation and Conclusions

When asked by the COP how the government would measure the success of the TARPfunded rescue, Ron Bloom, Treasury senior adviser on auto issues, gave the following
answer:
I think success will be measured in the way that one as a taxpayer would expect it to be
measured, and that is to say the taxpayers put a lot of money up and they want their
money back. So, the greater percentage of the money that we invested that we get back,
the greater success. That is clearly the primary measure (Bloom 2009b, 38).
Based on this metric, the rescues of GM and Chrysler were not totally successful. The
government reported recovering $39.7 billion with respect to its investment in GM.
(Treasury n.d.a). It also reported a $1.3 billion loss with respect to assistance to Chrysler,
and a $2.4 billon gain with respect to GMAC/Ally62 (Treasury n.d.a). Amounts loaned under
the ASSP program were also fully repaid and the funds under the AWCP were never
accessed.
However, the net gain or loss is not the only useful measure of the outcome of the
government’s efforts. Facing the prospect of the companies’ failures and the possible loss of
up to 1 million jobs and significant knock-on effects to the economy, the Bridge Loans
sustained the companies through their most critical period and a presidential transition and
later assistance helped them structure concrete plans for long-term viability. By some
measures, the rescue has been more successful than almost anyone predicted at the time.
Goolsbee and Krueger, two architects of the rescue have commented that: “In particular, we
had reservations about the long-run viability of the Chrysler-Fiat merger” (Goolsbee and
Krueger 2015, 22). However, both New GM and New Chrysler returned profits in 2010, the
year of their restructuring.
Another indicator of how investors perceived the success of the restructurings is that the
GM IPO, in which the government sold its first significant stake in the company, was
completed above the initial target price, permitting the government to sell more shares
than it had initially anticipated (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 42). It may also be argued that
The final sale of Treasury’s equity in GMAC was completed in an IPO on December 19, 2014. Treasury
ultimately recovered $19.6 billion on its investments in GMAC, a taxpayer profit of $2.4 billion (Treasury
2014a).
62
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if the government had held onto its shares longer, it might have been able to recover even
more for the taxpayers (COP 2011, 4). However, the timing of its sales was also influenced
by its stated desire to exit from being a major shareholder of a large public company sooner
rather than later (COP 2011, 4).
And, as early as 2011, a COP report noted that the industry was “reporting strong sales”
(COP 2011, 18):
The industry’s financial outlook has improved considerably over the past two years.
Despite a historically weak backdrop of US sales, the industry is now reporting strong
profits. The combination of greatly reduced capacity, generally stable market share,
and improved pricing has more than offset persistently weak (but improving) demand.
Thus, many industry observers believe that an improvement in the economy will result
in a disproportionate increase in profitability, as the industry will be able to increase
production without incurring meaningful new investment costs.
The White House considered the restructuring a success. A year after the bankruptcy
filings, the administration stated:
While this process of regaining long-term financial health will require much work,
innovation, and perseverance, there is no doubt that over the course of the past year
they have moved back from the brink to a position of contributing to the economic
recovery of the nation and auto communities (White House 2010, 16).63
It is also worth noting, however, that Goolsbee and Krueger also expressed a restrained
view of the bankruptcy proceedings as a tool stating that it was an especially clunky tool for
addressing problems that implicate “cross-industry spillovers or broader government or
social costs” (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 11-12). While they note that Chrysler
outperformed expectations after its restructuring, they also suggest that “to some extent,
Chrysler’s gains [in market share] came at the expense of the other domestic firms” like GM
(Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 16). Yet, they conclude that, “the auto industry’s outsized
contribution to the economic recovery has been one of the unexpected consequences of the
government intervention.” (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 22).
Klier and Rubenstein evaluated the rescues this way: “It is hard to say how much of the
current recovery is attributable to the government intervention, but we can say that the
ensuing restructuring of the Detroit carmakers has substantially changed the US auto
industry, perhaps permanently” (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 48). However, Bosco and
Plante (2013) pointed out that despite the benefits, the GM bankruptcy also delivered
President Obama also cited the auto rescue as one of the successes of his manufacturing polices in his 2012
State of the Union address (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 43). That same year, in a speech before the National
Automobile Dealers Association, President Bush also affirmed the decision to assist the industry (Klier and
Rubenstein 2012, 43).
63
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negative effects on stockholders and some creditors including owners of GM vehicles
whose claims were not absorbed by New GM.
Regarding the government’s overall effort, the COP concluded in a 2011 report that the
rescue had succeeded: “The industry’s improved efficiency has allowed automakers to
become more flexible and better able to meet changing consumer demands, while still
remaining profitable” (COP 2011, 15). Nevertheless, in addition to unique factors discussed
in Key Design Decision No. 17, the COP also identified a few areas of concern with the
government’s intervention that are worth noting:
(a) The panel discussed potential conflicts in the government’s role as majority
shareholder of a publicly held company including the possibility of using such
interest to pursue public policy goals and the risk of political interference in
government-owned entities. The panel suggested that holding the shares in an
independent trust similar to the government’s arrangement with the AIG equity
interest might alleviate some of these concerns and also pointed to differentiating
factors that might lessen the need for a trust (COP 2009b, 5).
(b) The panel raised concerns regarding appropriate stewardship and transparency
regarding the government’s investments in New GM and New Chrysler, private
companies, given the possible multi-year period until they might be liquidated.
(This concern was rendered moot by the relatively quick sale of the New Chrysler
shares to Fiat and the success of the GM IPO). It also questioned the timeliness of
the government’s exit from such investments, which, in effect, locked in losses and
guaranteed that all taxpayer funds might not be recovered. In the alternative, the
panel pointed favorably to the fact that the companies would be voluntarily filing
periodic reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission that would be made
public as being a helpful factor with respect to transparency (COP 2009b, 113).
(c) The panel raised concerns that by assisting the auto manufacturers, and especially
in absorbing some losses, the government may have created moral hazard and
extended the concept of “too big to fail” beyond financial institutions to a much
broader class of entity (COP 2011, 3).
(d)

The panel also suggested improvements to the governance of the bailout process,
such as improved transparency of both Treasury and company management,
establishment of clear goals and benchmarks to facilitate evaluation of progress,
and a better balance between Treasury’s dual roles as shareholder and government
policymaker (COP 2009b, 104–105).
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